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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD IN  
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOE) IN VIETNAM 
CASE OF VIETNAM SHIP-BUILDING INDUSTRY GROUP (VINASHIN) 
 
by 
 
Nguyen Thi Bich Ngoc 
 
 “Moral hazard” originally meant that people with insurance might be more careless 
when they were insured since they believed that the losses caused by their carelessness would 
be finally paid by the insurance companies. The term was later used in finance and banking 
and other areas of economics including government’s backing to big firms no matter if they 
were private and state-owned. 
The government’s backing to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam is 
problematic in two ways. First, the financial support is an implicit insurance for firms’ 
careless investment. Second, worrying that the government’s backing could lead to moral 
hazard, Vietnamese government has tried to direct SOEs with top-down intervention and 
regulations, believing that these actions will limit the risky behavior. The government has 
supposed that the combination of financial backing and their direction will help SOEs 
perform well.  However, instead of preventing SOEs from making risky decision, heavy 
intervention makes SOEs rely on the government’s direction passively. They believe that the 
government will be responsible for what they order firms to do. Therefore, the government’s 
intervention doubles the moral hazard in SOEs. This can be explained shortly in the 
following proposition (1) as the main hypothesis of the paper: 
 
 
Financial Backing + Top-down Intervention = Careless Decision + Passive Management 
 
The author also looks at the alternative hypothesis that leadership of the SOEs can 
affect the firm’s efficiency in the following proposition (2): 
Capable Leadership + Financial Backing + Top- down Intervention = Careful Decision 
+ Active Management 
 
The factor of competition cannot be applied to the situation of Vietnam as SOEs 
control all major industries. Moreover, the government has intervened heavily in and among 
SOEs. 
The original reason for the paradox in the main hypothesis is that the government has 
tried to manage SOEs as administrative institutions who receive funds and preferences to 
follow orders. SOEs were born as policy instruments and have been trapped in their decided 
role. Consequently, there are few incentives for the board of directors to focus on the 
performance of SOEs.  
Vietnam Ship-building Industry Group (VINASHIN) has been supported by 
Vietnamese government with easy access to financial recourses and favorable regulations 
since its establishment in 2006. However, contradict to the government’s expectation, 
VINASHIN fell into huge debt. It was in insolvency in 2009 and had to go through a 
restructuring program. After the restructuring program, the government has tried to rescue 
VINASHIN with more loans and support in 2011 and 2012. In 2012, the government has 
claimed to supervise the board of directors more carefully.  
 
 
After VINASHIN’s insolvency, a number of experts believe that there should be 
stricter supervision and direction to new VINASHIN as well as the new board of directors. 
However, the core solution should be giving more incentives for the new leadership to work 
effectively and make the firm efficient. 
This study will point out how the government’s intervention and financial backing to 
the firm led to VINASHIN’s insolvency and its remained problem even after the restructuring 
program. In another word, the case of VINASHIN is consistent with proposition (1) and 
rejects proposition (2). Policy implications are discussed in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
After the “Doimoi” Renovation (1986), the purpose of which was to transform the 
centrally-planned economy into a market-driven one, Vietnamese government established a 
number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), who controlled all key areas of the economy 
including electricity, construction, agricultural products, coal and textile. Big-size SOEs were 
initially formed as state corporations (SCs). They were later transferred into parent company-
subsidiary company relationship in 2001 in a pilot program. Some of SCs were turned into 
state economic groups (SEGs) in 2005. Until 2011, Vietnam had 12 SEGs and 96 SCs, all of 
which were based on parent company-subsidiary company relationship.  
As SOEs control almost all major sectors of Vietnam’s economy, the government has 
made efforts to improve their performance and efficiency. Most recent and noticeable 
facilitation toward SOEs includes further adjustments in legal frameworks of business 
ownership and financial support. However, many firms who have been supported by the 
government have shown poor performance and low efficiency. The government has been 
wondering why SOEs have not been successful and utilized its favorable conditions given by 
the government to improve their performance and efficiency. 
In order to answer the above question, the author formed the main hypothesis that the 
financial support and intervention from the government cause the double moral hazard in 
SOEs, which is the main cause of SOEs’ inefficiency. First, the financial support is an 
implicit insurance for firms’ careless investment. Second, worrying that the government’s 
backing could lead to moral hazard, Vietnamese government has tried to direct SOEs with 
top-down intervention and regulations, believing that these actions will limit the risky 
behavior. The government has supposed that the combination of financial backing and their 
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direction will help SOEs perform well.  However, instead of preventing SOEs from making 
risky decision, heavy intervention makes SOEs rely on the government’s direction passively. 
They believe that the government will be responsible for what they order firms to do. 
Therefore, the government’s intervention doubles the moral hazard in SOEs. This can be 
explained shortly in the following proposition (1) as the main hypothesis of the paper: 
Financial Backing + Top-down Intervention = Careless Decision + Passive Management 
 
The author considers two alternative hypotheses based on two viewpoints.  
First is that the role of the leadership is decisive. Experts studying leadership could 
argue that leadership, especially the CEO could change the situation in Vietnam’s SOEs. 
Certainly, without other factors, only capable leadership can affect firm’s efficiency 
positively. The author put the factor of capable leadership to the situation of SOEs in 
Vietnam to see if it with the government’s intervention, capable leadership could still control 
the situation and make the firm efficient. Based on this viewpoint, the author set up the 
following proposition (2) as an alternative hypothesis: 
Capable Leadership + Financial Backing + Top- down Intervention = Careful Decision 
+ Active Management 
 
This viewpoint was persuasively presented by Jonathan M. Karpoff, University of 
Washington and Emory University in 2001 in the paper “Public versus Private Initiative in 
Arctic Exploration: The Effects of Incentives and Organizational Structure”. Karpoff looked 
at a number of noticeable cases of public and private Arctic expeditions. He used a huge set 
of statistical data and recognized that private ones got significant achievement without 
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serious losses while public ones faced the opposite circumstances. His main discovery was 
that public expeditions’ poor performance is mostly due to the leadership of the crews. The 
public expedition’s leadership had few incentives to pursue expeditions, slow adaptability to 
new information and led unsuitably-structured organization. 
However, the case of VINASHIN has shown that the leadership (both before and after 
the restructuring program) has got very few chances to prove whether they are capable. The 
government has directed them to practice its policies. SOEs’ leadership became policy 
practitioners. They have few incentives to maximize their ability to make firms efficient. 
Experts could also argue that competition must be a factor affecting a firm’s 
efficiency. In 1993, a group of authors, Pinto, Brian; Merek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski in 
their paper “Transforming state enterprises in Poland: macroeconomic evidence on 
adjustment” claimed that in a free market with strong competition, SOEs could be as efficient 
as private firms. However, the authors also discussed that this optimistic picture happened if 
there were managerial incentives, elimination of easy loans. Comparing to the main 
hypothesis, these conditions already mean little financial backing and government’s 
intervention. In Vietnam, all the major industries are now under SOEs’ control. The 
competition is actually among SOEs. The government has intervened in SOEs’ activities as if 
they have owned all SOEs. The government could move some part of one SOE to another 
one to reduce the burden of debt for the former one. This happened in the case of VINASHIN. 
Therefore, the factor “competition” is already weakened by the factor “top-down 
intervention”. In particular, in the case of VINASHIN, the government moved some parts of 
VINASHIN to another SEG, Vietnam National Shipping Lines (VINALINES). Even if there 
were more than two ship-building SOEs to form competition among them, it would be 
difficult to have real competition when the government intervened into their activities deeply. 
Obviously, such intervention limited competition among SOEs. This argument is actually 
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supportive to the main hypothesis. Therefore, the author will work only on the propositions 
(1) and (2).  
Vietnam Ship-building Industry Group (VINASHIN) has been supported by 
Vietnamese government with easy access to financial recourses and favorable regulations 
since its establishment in 2006. However, contradict to the government’s expectation, 
VINASHIN fell into huge debt. It was in insolvency in 2009 and had to go through a 
restructuring program. After the restructuring program, the government has tried to rescue 
this economic group with more loans and support in 2011 and 2012. Besides, the government 
has assigned the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) to supervise VINASHIN’s organization 
and investment. A large part of the debt has been transferred to VINALINES1 who is another 
SEG. The case of VINASHIN has become the most noticeable case of SOEs who received 
the government’s tremendous support but conducted poor performance. 
Studying the case of VINASHIN both before and after its insolvency, the thesis will 
describe the government’s intervention and support to VINASHIN and the economic 
group’s inducing unnecessarily high level of risk-taking behavior. Analyzing favorable 
policies given to VINASHIN from its establishment to its insolvency and later to its 
restructuring program, the thesis will show a pattern of government’s support and 
VINASHIN’s dependence on this support to gain increasingly big loans. The thesis concludes 
that the case of VINASHIN is consistent with the hypothesis that the government’s backing 
and intervention could lead to careless decision and passive management. Furthermore, the 
results will provide implied lessons for improving SOEs’ performance and efficiency. 
 
                                                          
1 Unable to cover the debts of VINASHIN, VINALINES has even been reported to make a 
loss of 1,686 billion VND (80.84 million $US) by the Government Inspect in May 2012. This 
paper will not look at details of VINALINES case and just focuses on the case of VINASHIN.  
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The thesis includes five chapters. Chapter II is a literature review which looks at a 
number of papers discussing how the government’s intervention, especially financial support 
lead to firms’ inducing high level of risk-taking behavior. Several examples happened in 
United States and Korea. It also summarizes quite a few remarkable studies about 
Vietnamese government’s SOEs, especially during its equitization process. This process 
indicated that Vietnamese government had been struggling between improving SOEs and 
maintaining its dominant role. Chapter III explains the main hypothesis using Vietnamese 
government’s actions toward SOEs. The chapter describes how the government has 
intervened in firms’ operation and firms’ heavy dependence and poor performance. Chapter 
IV is about the specific case of VINASHIN. It analyzes the data from the case of VINASHIN 
with the particular favorable policies and direction from the government and VINASHIN’s 
risky behavior, which led to its insolvency. Then, the data analyzed show that the case of 
VINASHIN is consistent with the main hypothesis and rejects the alternative one. Chapter V 
includes key conclusions and implications. 
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CHAPTER II: (LITERATURE REVIEW) 
Government’s backing and moral hazard in big businesses 
2.1. Government’s intervention and firms’ risk-taking behavior 
“Moral hazard” is a basic term that was originally used in insurance industry. It 
meant that people with insurance might be more careless when they were insured since they 
believed that the insurance companies would finally pay the losses caused by their 
carelessness. Consequently, they induced more risk-taking behavior than they should. The 
term has later been used in finance, banking, and other areas of economics including 
government’s backing to big firms no matter if firms are private or state-owned.  
The term is often linked to “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions, which are thought by a 
number of governments to cause systematic fall to other institutions related to them if they 
fall. Therefore, these governments often protect big institutions with continuous subsidies. 
Learning that they are well protected and the governments will always pay for their risk and 
failure, firms often take more risk in lending and investment. 
The term can be understood the same way when a government supports big firms in other 
industries, especially those are considered strategic industries of the country. Also believing 
that the fall of big firms may affect the employment status, the institutions related to them or 
even the whole economy, the government also considers them “too-big-to-fail” firms and 
tries to rescue them whenever they face to bankruptcy.  
That a government is trying to intervene into firms’ operation can be linked to various 
theories and viewpoints on free market economy, planned economy and public good. 
However, this thesis paper narrows down to the moral hazard happening in firms who are 
insured by the government.  
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There have been a number of studies about institutions and firms’ inducing high level of 
risk-taking behavior due to the government’s support. A number of authors believe that firms 
who are supported by the government could take more risk and therefore, have poorer 
performance and lower efficiency. However, some others claim that worse outcome is 
uncertain. This supports the facts that many governments, including Vietnamese government 
still choose establishing and supporting SOEs the key to boost the economy. 
One of the examples is the case of U.S. government in 2006 during the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis. The federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac showed the serious 
weakness of the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) business model and its unreasonable 
combination of government mission and private ownership. Among many experts who 
studied this case was Peter J. Wallison, a resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy (AEI). Using the theory of market discipline, Wallison looked at the case 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to demonstrate how the government’s backing led to moral 
hazard. “Fannie and Freddie’s debt obligations - not just some limited amount corresponding 
to a bank’s deposits – [were] seen by U.S. and foreign investors as nearly risk-free, and 
therefore [were] not subject to market discipline. In effect, they [were] given a free pass to 
take risk.”2 The absence of market discipline he pointed out was more obvious when “they 
were not required to take the steps that all other companies must take to maintain their good 
credit standing, and so they did not take these steps.”3 He also criticized that “there [was] no 
reason why Fannie and Freddie should be permitted to buy and hold large portfolios of 
mortgages...Fannie and Freddie, in addition to their shareholders and managements, [would] 
profit from holding these portfolios, but if the risk they take [caused] them to suffer serious 
                                                          
2 Peter J. Wallison, Moral Hazard on Steroids: The OFHEO Report Shows that Regulation 
Cannot Protect U.S. Taxpayers, AEI Outlook Series, Website of  American Enterprise 
Institute For Public Policy Research, June 23, 2006, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24591 
3 Ibid 
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losses, the taxpayers [would] pick up the tab.”4 With this conclusion, he insisted that the only 
way to reduce the risk was to reduce risk activities. Consequently, regulations should limit 
the risk activities that firms could take. However, this recommendation could not truly solve 
the problem. Firms who are supported will always have incentives to induce risky behavior. 
Regulations may limit their activities in some areas but not all. They will try to take other risk 
activities in unregulated areas. 
Although a number of authors have claimed that the government’s backing could lead 
to moral hazard, and therefore lead to the supported firms’ inefficiency, there are still debates 
on whether risky behavior leads to firms’ low performance. In 2009, Baird Webel, a 
specialist in financial economics at U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) studied the 
impact of enduring government assistance for the American International Group (AIG). The 
author looked carefully into the evidences of the government’s support to AIG such as “$85 
billion loan from the Fed… on relatively onerous terms with a high interest rate,…a handover 
of 79.9% of the equity in AIG to the government, … up to $70 billion in capital injections 
through preferred share purchases by the Treasury… ”5 Looking at the subsidies and AIG’s 
performance, he concluded that “[d]espite access to up to more than $190 billion in assistance 
from the federal government, the outlook for AIG [appeared] very uncertain… [and] the 
long-term effect of the government involvement with AIG [was] unclear.”6 This judgment 
was from the fact that potential customers of AIG valued the government’s support 
differently. “[Some might] conclude that, because of the government backing, AIG [was] a 
safe and reliable company to purchase insurance from… [Others did] not want to rely on a 
                                                          
4 Ibid 
5  Baird Webel, Specialist in Financial Economics, U.S. Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), “Ongoing Government Assistance for American International Group (AIG)” 
(document prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, 2009), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40438.pdf, 1. 
6 Baird Webel (2009), 11. 
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business that [depended] on a government support to continue operating.”7 Within this logic, 
it could be uncertain for big firms in other industries who are supported by the government to 
have poor performance or not. Firms who are well guaranteed by the government may have 
more consumers and receive more contracts as people believe it will be eternally strong under 
the government’s protection. However, the author only looked at the short-term effect of the 
government’s support. After a long time, if a firm faces to insolvency for a number of times 
and the government continues its support, hardly can any customer believe in the firm’s 
strength. 
Another famous case is Korean government’s support to chaebol groups8. Many authors 
have been interested in chaebol establishment and expansion. Among them was Kim Ky Won 
with his paper “Chaebol Restructuring and Family Business in Korea” in 2004. The author 
pointed out that from the earlier establishment since Korea’s independence from Japan, 
chaebol started with a number of advantages given by the new government. In order to 
rebuild the country, Korea had to redistribute the properties left by the colonists and “[re-
establish] the external trade and foreign exchange regime…” 9 In this period, “formerly 
Japanese-owned industrial properties…[were sold] far below the market value ...”10 Those 
businesspersons who got these conditions were the founders of chaebol11. Second, according 
to the author, after the war, Korea had to import a big amount of consumer goods. As the 
import trade market played a significant role in the country economic development, chaebol 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 This thesis paper narrows down to Vietnam’s SOEs and does not compare Korean chaebol 
and Vietnam SOEs. Chaebol have been recognized by many people as Korean’s pride and 
surely gained particular success. The paper only looked at Chaebol from the aspect that the 
government used the firms as their policy instruments that led to moral hazard. 
9 Kim Ky Won, “Chaebol Restructuring and Family Business in Korea”, presented at the IDE 
International Workshop on Family Business in the Developing Countries, January, 2004, 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11  While some authors consider early chaebol government’s favored group, most others 
believe they selected based on capability. 
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gained enormous opportunities. Again, the government gave outstanding advantages to 
chaebol groups. Third, when the government promoted export, “the chaebol were able to gain 
access to operating money at low interest rates from Korean banks,…[and] massive 
introduction of foreign loans,…explicit repayment guarantees to foreign financial institutions 
on loans extended to the chaebol.”12 With all these advantages, chaebol had risk partnership 
with Korean government. The government monitored the loans and issued the loans to 
chaebol not only when chaebol needed financial resource but also when the government 
wanted them to realize its industrial policies. The government’s support to chaebol groups is 
more noticeable in the investment boom in the late 1960s. When “firms could not meet their 
foreign debt obligations, the government held the incumbent owners accountable by taking 
over managerial control of their companies.”13 The government’s backing to firms in this 
case is like a full insurance with cheap premium. Chaebol groups would be saved from any 
bad consequences and were given highest incentives to take highest risk.  
The author emphasized that Korean chaebol groups received most support from the 
government when the country directed toward heavy and chemical industries in 1970s. 
“Along with the Emergency Decree of 1972, which placed an immediate moratorium on the 
payment of all corporate debt to the curb lenders, this drive transformed the government-
business risk partnership in favor of the chaebol.”14 Moreover, in order to support chaebol, 
the government had to trade off the development of small and medium firms in light 
manufacturing industries. At this time, chaebol’s expansion was not based on 
competitiveness but the power of the government. Obviously, the author described how 
chaebol were established following the government’s policies in trade promotion and 
industry development. Although chaebol groups were private businesses, they were actually 
                                                          
12 Kim Ky Won (2004), 3. 
13 Kim Ky Won (2004), 4. 
14 Ibid. 
 11 
 
used as industrial policy instruments. The Korean government’s heavy intervention happened 
frequently from the early birth of chaebol groups until their peak of development.  
Due to the government’s backing, the author also claimed that chaebol faced to 
serious problems although a number of chaebol groups gained huge benefits and grew fast in 
the early stage. In 1970s, “the chaebol grew to control businesses across most of the 
important industries, including manufacturing, distribution, construction, and so on. The ten 
largest chaebol increased their share of [gross national product] (GNP) from 4.7% (1974) to 
9.7% (1979)... The number of affiliates of the 30 largest chaebol rose from 126 in 1970 to 
429 in 1979, with the average number of affiliates changing from 4.2 to 14.3 during the same 
period...” 15  However, when the government support was abused, the market became 
uncompetitive. Besides, big chaebol groups used their privilege carelessly. As they controlled 
all major industries and resources of the country, their losses meant huge damage to the 
economy. “Korea found itself in a severe economic crisis in 1979 and the chaebol sector was 
a major culprit. Its expansion into uncompetitive businesses endangered macroeconomic 
growth and stability.”16  
2.2. The government’s intervention and support and moral hazard in SOEs in Vietnam  
 In Vietnam, SOEs have been studied by international and domestic experts since its 
establishment. SOEs’ performance has been increasingly noticed since their equitization. It is 
obvious that Vietnamese government “recognized the inefficiency of SOE sector but 
attempted to restructure and equitize SOEs rather than privatizing them”17. This is why many 
papers have studied the equitization process of SOEs to identify what the government has 
done and what should be done to improve SOEs’ efficiency.  Various studies have worked on 
                                                          
15 Kim Ky Won (2004), 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), “Vietnam Economy” SOE reform 
and Market Structure”, a presentation at APEC Submit 2011. 
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the efficiency of SOEs’ equitization process and provided different outcomes. Some studies 
have claimed that a number of equitized SOEs “[have] been able to mobilize investment 
capital to upgrade equipment and technology, become more efficient …and adapt better to 
the market mechanism.”18 Others believe that “Vietnamese government faced with many 
difficulties in the equitization process… [and] the changes in legal frameworks 
acknowledged the Government’s efforts…to reduce the loss [of state property]…”19 However, 
most of the studies looked at the final outcomes, economic performance without linking those 
outcomes to the original reason of the government’s backing and intervention while it is the 
core cause of the inefficiency of equitization process. 
Early after two first periods of the equitization process, the Pilot Equitization (1991-1997) 
and the Accelerated Equitization (1996-2001), a joint survey led by Tran Tien Cuong, PhD., 
Director, Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) in 2002 named “Vietnam’s Equitized Enterprises: An ex-post Study of 
Performance, Problems and Implications for Policy” produced a comprehensive evaluation of 
the equitized firms. The study randomly surveyed a large sample of 877 enterprises in almost 
all economic sectors and provinces of Vietnam. The questionnaire was carefully constructed 
to obtain both quantitative measures of performance trends of the enterprises and qualitative 
assessment through senior enterprise managers’ opinions. The quantitative questions aimed at 
collecting important performance indicators including profit, exports, labor productivity, 
assets, total labor cost, average wage, number of workers, value-added and sales while the 
qualitative ones explored the role of the firms’ directors during the decision-making process. 
“With ninety percent of respondents saying that financial performance was rated “better” or 
                                                          
18Tran Ngoc Phuong, Standing Vice Chairman, “Ho Chi Minh City’s Enterprise Reform and 
Management Board. Reform of State Owned Enterprises in the Context of Vietnam’s WTO 
Accession” (working paper, WBI-Training Program with World Bank, 2005), 9-10. 
19 Vo Tri Thanh, PhD., Vice President, CIEM, MPI, “Lessons for Vietnamese government in 
Equitization: Evidences from IPO’s” (working paper, 2011). 
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“much better”…” 20 , the study concluded that there was “a strongly positive result for 
equitization” and the role of the board of directors has become more important in the 
decision-making process of the enterprises. Undoubtedly, the huge data source and detailed 
survey statistics produced an overall picture of the equitized firms. However, as the 
questionnaire asked for opinions of managers to evaluate the firms’ performance as “better” 
or “worse,” a number of results turned out to be personal judgments. Moreover, the paper did 
not realize that the role of the board of directors was actually decided by the government’s 
level of intervention into the firms. Those who were under government’s heavy intervention 
and backing could behave differently from those who were not. 
Another study which also compared the enterprises’ performance before and after 
equitization was “Equitization and Firm Performance: The Case of Vietnam,” a study in 
the East Asian Development Network (EADN) grant project in 2007, ten years after the start 
of the third period of equitization, the Related Transformations (1997-Present). It was 
conducted by a group of independent experts: Truong Dong Loc (Team Leader), Nguyen Huu 
Dang and Nguyen Van Ngan in Vietnam. Applying the regression testing methodology by 
Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) and collecting the data of 147 equitized firms and 
                                                          
20 Tran Tien Cuong, PhD., Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), “Vietnam’s 
Equitized Enterprises: An ex-post Study of Performance, Problems and Implications for 
Policy”, a joint survey by CIEM, MPI and World Bank in 2002, 29. (According to the 
acknowledgement of the paper, it was conducted by a team of researchers and experts: “This 
report was prepared under the auspices of the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(CIEM), an organ of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI).  The Study Team was 
headed by PhD Tran Tien Cuong, Director of the CIEM’s Business Management Department.  
The survey was executed by Investment and Business Consultants, Inc (IBCI), an affiliate of 
the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), under the guidance of Nguyen 
Gia Hao.  Key personnel at CIEM were Bui Van Dung, Nguyen Kim Anh, Pham Duc Trung, 
Nguyen Thi Lam Ha, Nguyen Thi Luyen, and Trinh Duc Chieu.  Leroy Jones and Raymond 
Mallon served as international consultants.  Statistical analysis was done by domestic 
consultants Hoang Thanh Huong and Pham Anh Tuyet.  The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) provided financial support and 
inputs from Kazi Matin, Daniel Musson and Minh Pham Duc.”), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTVIETNAMINVIETNAMESE/Resources/other_report
s_post_equitization.pdf 
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92 SOEs, the study focused on performance measures including profitability, operating 
efficiency, output (real sales), leverage, employment and employee income. The survey was 
designed with objective criteria and consisted of one questionnaire focusing on income and 
debt of the firms and another one evaluating ownership structure, the board of directors and 
personal management based on statistics and numbers. This study’s advancement was the 
comparison of results from the statistical test for two groups: Control Group (SOEs) and 
Treatment Group (equitized firms) which controlled a number of other dependent variables. 
Different from previous papers which focused on the reasons that improved performance, the 
study identified both negative and positive impacts of a number of determinants on firms’ 
performance including size of firms, ownership and corporate governance, state ownership, 
chairperson of the board of directors and the stock-market. Obviously, the innovative 
comparison and regression tests brought a critical view into the impacts of various factors on 
firms’ performance. However, the study produced over-optimistic outcomes as it did not 
identify the government’s support in each period of time.  
Among the most recent studies was “Governance of Economic Groups in Vietnam: A 
Proposal for Reform,” which was conducted in January 2011 by Professor Il Chong Nam, 
KDI School for Public Policy and Management, Republic of Korea and Le Manh Hung, 
Deputy Director General, Agency for Enterprise Development, MPI. The Korean author has 
understood fully and deeply Vietnam’s SOEs including SOEs’ context and the reasons for 
SOEs’ poor performance. The study frankly criticized the management structure of SOEs and 
strongly recommended a set of critical measures in equitization process to improve Vietnam’s 
overall situation. Studying carefully the performance of SOEs and the current legal 
frameworks, the authors came to a creative and clear policy proposal including “unbundling 
of governance of [SOEs] from other government functions… running [SOEs] as commercial, 
profit-oriented enterprises …, [clear] appointment, evaluation, remuneration of executives 
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and board members, and [improving] transparency in accounting and finance.” The paper has 
found out that “there is a wide variation in the growth rate, profitability, and debt/equity 
ratios. While most State Economic Groups (SEGs) show reasonably high profitability and 
debt/equity ratios, some SEGs show very low profitability. Further, some SEGs or their 
subsidiaries have extremely high debt/equity ratios with very low profitability, suggesting 
that the risk of insolvency can be high for those firms.”21 The paper has concluded that the 
Decree on Pilot Establishment, Organization, Operation and Management of the State 
Economic Groups in November 2009 “specifies building of competitive business organizations 
as one of the main objectives of governance of SEGs [while] it also allows the government to 
use SEGs as policy instruments. As a result, the line ministries are still playing a crucial role in 
the governance of SEGs. The Decree also contains a number of elements that are not 
compatible with the efficiency of an SEG, subsidiary of an SEG, or elements that are not 
consistent with effective enforcement of the competition policy or regulation of public 
utilities.”22 By this way, the author has identified the deepest reasons why a number of EGs in 
Vietnam have been performing inefficiently. He also emphasized that “[t]he government 
needs to accept the principle that for Vietnam to prosper economically it is necessary to clearly 
separate the roles of the government and the roles of the corporate sector. Commercial 
enterprises need to be run by profit seeking management.”23 This thesis agrees with the author 
on that Vietnamese government wishes to use SEGs as policy instruments and looks into the 
particular case of VINASHIN to demonstrate the particular consequence of the government’s 
intervention as causing moral hazards. 
                                                          
21  Il Chong Nam (2011), Professor of KDI School for Public Policy and Management, 
“Governance of Economic Groups in Vietnam: A Proposal for Reform”, Knowledge Sharing 
Program (KSP)’s final report, 2-3. 
22 Il Chong Nam (2011), 2-3. 
23 Il Chong Nam (2011), 35. 
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From above analyses, it is obvious that a number of previous studies have constructed a 
huge data set of SOEs, especially in the equitization process in Vietnam. However, many of 
them did not fully study the core reason of firms’ unreasonable investment, which mainly 
causes the poor performance and the inefficiency of SOEs. Therefore, a case study like this 
thesis paper is needed to describe how the government’s backing could lead to firms’ 
inducing high level of risk- taking behavior and then, their shutdown. The thesis paper will 
draw lessons from the case study to recommend practical ways to improve its situation. These 
lessons could be useful to similar cases of SOEs in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER III: VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS’ FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND 
INTERVENTION IN BIG FIRMS AND THEIR INEFFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
 
This chapter explains the main hypothesis, proposition (1), using the government’s 
intervention in SOEs in Vietnam and their efficient performance. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that moral hazard happens when the government bails out firms. 
Financial Backing + Top-down Intervention = Careless Decision + Passive Management  
 
The government’s financial backing to SOEs is obvious as SOEs are established under 
the government decisions. Moreover, SOEs are given capital to realize the government’s 
policies. The government’s intervention into all SOEs in general is mostly shown by its legal 
regulations applying to SOEs. As the author looks at SOEs in general in this chapter, their 
careless decision and passive management are indirectly shown by their poor performance 
and low efficiency.  
3.1. Vietnamese government’s financial support to SOEs 
As SOEs have been always considered the key of the nation’s economy, the government 
has put huge investment into SOEs. 
From early birth as SCs, SOEs were established using State budget. When transforming 
SCs to SEGs, the government used more investment to turn them into large conglomerates. 
Comparing to non-state sector and foreign-invested sector, SOEs have always received 
biggest investment. According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO), the 
investment into SOEs has a firmly increasing trend from 1995 to 2010 (based on fixed price 
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in 1994) as shown in chart 1. Moreover, its ratio over the total investment is always from 
40% to 60% in the last 17 years24 as shown in chart 2.  
Chart 1: Investment among sectors (SOEs, Non-SOEs and Foreing-Invested sector) 
in Vietnam 
Source: General Statistics Office (GSO) of 
Vietnam, http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=392&idmid=3&ItemID=11380 
 
                                                          
24 The data of the year 2011 is preliminary data 
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Chart 2: Investment among sectors (SOEs, Non-SOEs and Foreing-Invested 
sector) in Vietnam in percentage 
Source: General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam, http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=392&idmid=3&ItemID=11380 
 
Next, SOEs have got easy access to all sources of loans as banks have relied on the 
government’s suport. According to the publication of the auditing results of SCs and SEGs in 
July 2012, 11 over 21 audited SCs and SEGs have been reported to operate using loans as the 
main source of capital. The list of SOEs who rank highest in the list of high debt/equity ratio 
includes Truong Son Construction SC with that ratio of 9.19 (times), Infrastructure 
Construction and Development SC with that ratio of 4.79,Vietnam Housing and Urban 
Development SEG (HUD) with that ratio of 4.01, EVN with that ratio of 3.83,  and 
VINALINES with that ratio of 3.2125. Easy loans have led to the huge bad debt of banks. 
According to Dr. Deepak Mishra, an expert in World Bank, Vietnamese SOEs’ debt accounts 
                                                          
25 The data about SOEs with high debt/equity ratio is reorganized from the article by Thuy 
Duong, “Publication of auditing results of SCs and SEGs”, Vietnam Customs website, 18 
July 2012, www.baohaiquan.vn/pages/cong-bo-ket-qua-kiem-toan-nha-nuoc-cua-nam-2011-
cac-tap-doan.aspx, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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for 60% of all banks and financial institutions’ credit and 70% of the total bad debt of all the 
banks in the country26. 
Another problem is about SOEs’ land ownership. While private firms in the country have 
had to hire or buy land at high price, SOEs own a large total area of land. Although SOEs 
also have to pay a rental fee, the fee is quite low which is 2,316 VND/m2 (1.09 $US/m2). 
Some SOEs even pay lower fee, from 800 to 1000 VND/m2 (0.38 to 0.47 $US/m2). This 
special advantage makes a lot of SOEs try to own as much land as possible and sell the land 
when they need more investment capital. A number of SOEs own land sites at valuable 
locations but abandon the land sites for a long time which is really a waste of resources. One 
example is Southern Food State Corporation (VINAFOOD 2). According to the Public Assets 
Management Agency under Ministry of Finance (MOF), this SC was established in the 
centrally-planned economic period. It has been allowed to own 35127 sites in Ho Chi Minh 
city to construct food retail distribution network over the city. When the economy transferred 
to market economy, this SC have still kept these sites to construct housing buildings for its 
staff and for rent. 
 
3.2. Vietnamese government’s remained dominant intervention in SOEs  
Vietnamese government’s intervention in SOEs is clearly shown by a number of actions 
from its establishing SOEs in the early time to its regulations applied to SOEs in the present 
time, including: 
                                                          
26 The data about Vietnamese SOEs’ debt is reorganized from the article by Tran Minh Tinh, 
“SOEs’ bad debt: clear objectives but unclear roadmap”, VINA Corp, March 13 2012, 
vinacorp.vn/news/xu-ly-no-xau-doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-muc-tieu-da-ro-lo-trinh-thi-
chua/công trình-505641, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
27 The data about VINAFOOD 2 is reorganized from the article “SOEs tries to maintain 
valuable land sites which create losses for the government”, Education Newspapers website, 
March 24 2012, giaoduc.net.vn/NTD-thong-thai/Doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-chiem-giu-dat-
vang-gay-lang-phi-lon/132902.gd, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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- Establishing and restructuring SOEs as policy tools; 
- Intervening heavily into the valuation process; 
- Issuing few preferential policies for creditors in the debt-equity swap (DES); 
- Issuing few incentives for investors to become shareholders of SOEs; 
- Applying increasingly strict financial supervision to SOEs. 
 A summary of the legal documents studied in this chapter is presented in the 
following table: 
Table 1: Legal documents related to SOEs 
No. Legal Documents’ Names Main contents 
1.  Financial Supervision Regulation Putting all SOEs and the enterprises having 
State equity under strict financial 
supervision 
2.  Government’s Decree No. 
153/2004/ND-CP dated 09 August 
2004 
Transferring SCs into parent company-
subsidiary company form 
3.  Government’s Decree No. 187 dated 
16 November 2004  
Regulating that firms must maintain some 
parts of state equity in order to be equitized 
4.  Circular No. 126/2004/TT-BTC dated 
24 December 2004 
Regulating that Debt-Equity Swap process 
would have to follow the IPO regulations 
with the price identified in the public 
auction 
5.  Prime Minister’s Decision No. 
14/2011/QĐ-TTg dated 14 March 
2011  
Setting the criteria and categories of the 
SOEs which are 100% owned by the state 
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6.  Government’s Decree 59/2011/ND-
CP dated 18 July 2011  
(replacing the Decree 109/2007/ND-
CP) 
Transforming the SOEs who are owned 
100% by the state into equitized firms 
7.  Prime Minister’s Decisions No. 90-
TTg and No. 91-TTg dated 07 April 
1994 
Establishing SCs 90 and SCs 91 
 
3.2.1. Establishing and restructuring SOEs as policy tools 
Since 1980s, Vietnamese government has made efforts to establish SOEs as industrial 
development tools. After the “Doimoi” Renovation (1986), the purpose of which was to 
transform the centrally-planned economy into a market-driven one, Vietnamese government 
established a number of SOEs that controlled all key areas of the economy including 
electricity, construction, agricultural products, coal and textile. Big-size SOEs were initially 
formed as SCs according to the two Prime Minister’s Decisions No. 90-TTg and No. 91-TTg 
dated 07 April 1994. SCs were named SCs 90 and SCs 91 following these decisions. 
 According to the above decisions, SCs 90 must include at least five subsidiaries which 
operated in the fields of technology, finance, investment program, service, consumers, 
information and training. SCs 90 must have the size of at least VND 500 billion ($US 25 
million). One of the most important features was that line ministries and People’s 
Committees were delegated by the government to establish SCs 90. This made SCs 
administrative agencies better than firms. After six years, 76 SCs 90 were established 
including 12 SCs in industrial area, 14 in agricultural product area, 12 in transportation, 11 in 
construction, three in aquatic product, five in banking, two in medical care, one in post and 
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telecommunication and one in culture. There were nine SCs 90 established by provincial 
People’s Committees.  
On the other hand, when the government established SC 91s, they intended to use them as 
the pilot forms to establish State Economic Groups (SEGs). However, none of them were 
transformed in to SEGs until 2005. The management in SCs 91 is not much different from 
that of SCs 90 as they were set up under strict direction of the government. All SCs 91 must 
be established under the government’s decisions. Furthermore, all the members of the board 
of directors of SCs 91 were assigned by the Prime Minister. Again, the way SCs 91 and their 
board of directors were established is similar to that of administrative agencies. In details, 
SCs 91 must have at least seven subsidiaries and the minimum size must be VND 1000 
billion ($US 50 million). While SCs 90 focused on one area, SCs 91 could invest in a number 
of areas but still had to maintain one major field.  
The government started to transfer SCs into parent company-subsidiary company form 
(but maintain their names as SCs) in 2001 in a pilot program which was later regulated by the 
Government’s Decree No. 153/2004/ND-CP dated 09 August 2004. At this moment, the 
government wished to turn administration mechanism in SCs into investment mechanism. 
With this effort, the government intended to make SOEs more similar to making-profit firms. 
In 2005, the Prime Minister established first eight State Economic Groups (SEGs) 28  which 
were transformed from the SCs of important areas. In total, 12 SCs 91 were transformed into 
SEGs. Until 2011, Vietnam had 12 SEGs29 and 96 SCs, all of which were based on parent 
                                                          
28 They are Electricity Group (EVN), Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petro Vietnam or PVN), 
Vietnam National Coal and Mineral Industries Group (VINACOMIN), Vietnam Post and 
Telecommunications Group (VNPT), Vietnam Shipbuilding Industrial Group (VINASHIN), 
Vietnam National Textile Garment Group (VINATEX), Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG) and 
Vietnam Insurance Group (BaoViet). From 2006 to 2011, four more SEGs have been 
established. 
29 However, until now, the 12 SEGs which controlled all important industries of Vietnam 
have not been clearly recognized as any legal entity under the law. According to the 
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company-subsidiary company relationship. However, as the government could not give up its 
power and dominant role in SOEs, SEGs enlarged the size of SCs while the management 
mechanism was not much changed. 
During the last two decades, Vietnamese government has been seeking ways to 
restructure SOEs to improve their performance and efficiency. When one SOE is not efficient, 
the government can apply one of the following solutions: equitization (changing the SOEs 
into joint stock companies), selling one whole SOE to another organization, merging the SOE 
or a part of it to another one, announcing bankruptcy and dissolution, transferring the SOE to 
limited liability company, transferring the SOE to an income-generating administration 
agency, moving the SOE to another administrative agency and transferring the SOE into 
parent company-subsidiary company form. A summary of all SOEs restructured can be 
presented in table 2: 
Table 2: The number of restructured SOEs from 2002 to 2007 
Source: the Enterprise Development Agency, Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
Restructuring methods Number of SOEs restructured 
Equitization (totally or partially) 3,756 
Selling one whole SOE to another organization 373 
Merging the SOE or a part of it to another one 504 
Announcing bankruptcy and dissolution 260 
Transferring the SOE to single-member limited liability 282 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Enterprise Law 2005, SOEs are the enterprises, more than 50% of the charter capital of which 
is owned by the State. Since 1st July 2010, all the SOEs which were 100% owned by the State, 
including the parent companies of SEGs, have been transformed to either limited liability 
companies or joint stock companies regulated by the Enterprise Law 2005. 
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company 
Transferring the SOE to an income-generating 
administration agency 
111 
Moving the SOE to another management agency  77 
Transferring the SOE into parent company-subsidiary 
company form 
108 
Total 5,474 
 
In table 2, from 2002 to 2007, there were more than 5,000 SOEs restructured, more 
than 3,000 of which were equitized. The number of equitized firms accounted for 55% of the 
SOEs which were restructured from 2001 to 2010. However, from 2011 to the first half 2012, 
the equitization process has been slow down due to complicated administrative procedure. 
Although the government has been trying to give more freedom and independence to SOEs 
by equitizing them, the government still controls the equitization process tightly.  
In details, the definition of equitization is clarified with the following criteria: “the 
equitized enterprise is registered as a joint stock company, operating under the Enterprise 
Law applicable to private enterprises…; ownership is diffuse…; competitive bidding is not 
used; workers and managers become majority owners…; the state often retains some share, 
but seldom is the majority shareholder…; and third parties almost always take some share but 
seldom a majority stake.”30 The overall process of equitization process can be summarized in 
the following table: 
                                                          
30 Tran Tien Cuong (2002), 6-12. 
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Table 3: The equitization process in Vietnam 
Source: The table is redrawn based on the source from the Eurocham Vietnam 
www.eurochamvn.org/downloads/EquitizationProcessVietnam.ppt 
Equitization Plan Initial Offering Completion Post-Equitization 
-Establishment of Steering 
Committee and Assistant 
team 
-Documentation: valuation 
method, legal document, 
audited financial statements 
and other related assets’ 
approval 
-Equitization plan: 
introduction, labor planning, 
business and equitization 
plan, IPO method 
-Association with 
financial institute to 
IPO 
-Auction at the 
company/securities 
companies/ stock 
exchange 
-Shareholders’ 
meeting 
-Publicizing 
information about 
the newly formed 
joint-stock company 
-Hand over from 
SOE to joint-stock 
company 
-Registration and 
licensing 
-Restructuring 
Management 
- Audit appointment 
 
Right from the definition of equitization, there is a paradox. The government wishes a 
number of parties own and be responsible for a firm’s operation so that it will be more 
competitive while the government still desires to control the equitized firm by its role as the 
major shareholder. This equitization process implied that the government had been being 
trapped in its efforts. It cannot give up its intervention in SOEs while at the same time it 
demands SOEs to perform well and boost the economy. 
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In the last two decades, the equitization process has passed through four stages31. 
However, although the government tried to make several changes in each stage, all the stages 
of the equitization process have not shown enough incentives to board of the directors as well 
as the share holders. The government has still supervised and directed SOEs’ management as 
administrative agencies. This ambition of the government has not only slowed down the 
equitization process but also created double moral hazard as the equitized firms have reasons 
to depend on the government’s support and direction passively.   
3.2.2. Intervening into the valuation process 
Vietnamese government remained controlling power over SOEs most noticeably in 
SOEs’ valuation process. Although the Government’s Decree 59/2011/ND-CP dated 18 July 
2011 on “Transforming the SOEs who is owned 100% by the state into an equitized firm” has 
replaced the Decree 109/2007/ND-CP32 and amended some important issues to accelerate the 
equitization process, there are still concerns about the valuation process of SOEs to be 
equitized. The core reason is that the government has been worried that SOEs will be valued 
too low which would lead to huge loss of the state assets.  
                                                          
31 The first one was the Pilot Equitization (1991-1997) which was based on voluntarism. The 
SOEs chosen were of small and medium size, high efficiency and operating in the fields the 
Government did not have to control 100% equity. Moreover, the workers and the managers of 
the SOEs chosen volunteered to equitize the firm. These were the criteria of the Prime 
Minister’s Decision No. 202/CT dated 08 June 1992 and Directive No. 84/TTg dated 04 
Aug.1993. In five years, there were only five SOEs equitized. The second stage was the 
Expansion of the Pilot one. There were only 25 SOEs equitized in this period. The third is the 
Accelerated Equitization (1997-2001) with the Government’s series of modifications to the 
process. One of the most noticeable legal documents was the Decree 44/1998/NĐ-CP which 
gave incentives to the SOEs equitized and their workers. The last one is Continuing the 
Equitization Process Intensively (2001-Present) with the issue of the Decree 184/2004/ND-
CP. Only until this time, the government started to request a transparent auction to put the 
enterprises on the stock market. This Decree intended to create a more transparent and 
healthy environment for the equitized SOEs. 
32 According to the new decree, a firm’s competitive advantage includes only trade mark 
value and development potential, not geographical location as stated in the old decree 
109/2007/ND-CP.  
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According to the Article No. 27 of the new decree, the State Auditing Office (SAO) must 
participate into the valuation process before IPO of the enterprises whose size is above VND 
500 billion ($US 25 million) in insurance, banking, telecommunication, airline, coal and 
valuable minerals mining areas. The maximum period of time for SAO to complete the 
auditing is 75 working days which is obviously a long time.  As most of the firms in Vietnam 
are of this size, the overall equitization process will be seriously slowed down. This Article 
also regulates that when the valuation results made by authorized agencies and the (SAO) are 
different, there should be meetings for parties to come to one final outcome or reports to the 
Prime Minister before the publication of the firm’s value. This regulation has lengthened the 
valuation process in a number of equitized firms.  
Next, according to the Article No. 32 of the new decree, “business advantage” is 
calculated as a part of the firm’s value. However, many equitized firms have met difficulties 
in identifying how much trademark value and development potential contributes to the firm’s 
value, especially when this issue is quite new to Vietnam.  
Until now, the valuation process has not been undertaken by one or a group of 
independent valuation institutions. The decision makers are still government agencies 
representing the SOEs’ ownership. This makes the valuation process lack transparency and 
damages the trust of investors.  
When the valuation system is still problematic, SOEs meet difficulties in speeding up 
their IPO. 
3.2.3. Issuing few preferential policies for creditors in the debt-equity swap  
Recently, the government has been trying to create more solutions for insolvent firms. 
However, during the practical process, the government still hesitates to give enough 
incentives for creditors. 
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Among the most effective solutions is debt-equity swap. This is clearly explained in the 
recent Government’s Decree 59/2011/ND-CP. This new decree is an amendment to the old 
decree about the insolvent firms. In the old decree, after the firm valuation process, if the 
present value of the firm is lower than the debt, that firm will have to announce bankruptcy or 
dissolution. However, the new decree allows the Debt and Asset Trading Corporation 
(DATC) under MOF and the creditors to establish the restructuring plan together, mostly 
through DES method. If the restructuring is not feasible, the firm can be later transformed 
into other forms33. Moreover, in the past, according to the Government’s Decree No. 187 
dated 16 Nov. 2004 and MOF’s Circular No. 126/2004/TT-BTC dated 24 Dec. 2004, firms 
must maintain some parts of the state equity in order to be equitized. However, there were 
firms which already have negative state equity after an inefficient operation time. Under the 
pressure of these regulations, firms had to exaggerate their true value to occupy the negative 
equity. Therefore, after equitization, many firms did not have sufficient financial capacity to 
operate properly. In case the negative equity was too large which could not be occupied by 
the exaggerated value, the firms could not be equitized and just waited to be sold or 
announced to go bankruptcy. Now, in similar cases, DES is considered a double-effect 
solution for SOEs of poor financial status as it can help creditors, in particular, banks to 
recover their bad debt as well as equitize the firms which are not efficient.  
DATC was actually established in order to realize the above new policy. DATC is 
considered a policy instrument to manage the financial status of SOEs. The most important 
role of DATC is to work on firms’ debt and improve their financial status, transfer their 
ownership, seek strategic partners to support in capital, technology and management so that 
the firms can reorganize their management and improve their performance after ownership 
transferring. However, since 2010, the process of debt transferring has slowed down. This is 
                                                          
33 “Other forms” are not yet specified by the government. 
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because while demanding DTAC to seek solutions for insolvent firms, the government has 
still tried to intervene into DTAC’s operation and working mechanism with insolvent firms 
tightly. Due to the unreasonable regulations, DTAC has met many difficulties in debt-equity 
swap (DES) as the followings: 
First is the limitation in IPO regulations. According to the Circular No. 126/2004/TT-
BTC, DES has to follow the IPO regulations with the price identified in the public auction. 
The circular regulates that the initial shares structure includes the state shares, the shares with 
preferential prices for workers, strategic partners and the shares sold in public auction for 
investors. So the creditors have to participate into the public auction like investors. In case 
the creditors cannot win the auction, the DES will not happen. Due to this limitation, the 
creditors are unwilling to remove the debt for the firms as they are afraid that the debt is not 
guaranteed to be transformed to shares through public auctions.  
Second, the creditors receive no preferential policies as the workers and strategic partners 
do. The Circular No. 126/2004/TT-BTC regulates the mechanism of reducing the shares 
average price to 40% for workers and 20% for strategic partners, but not for creditors. This 
gives the creditors no incentives to remove the debt for the firms. 
Third, the entire surplus gained from the public auction is regulated to be owned by the 
state. This affects the financial and operation capacity of the firms after equitization. 
Therefore, the creditors are worried about the performance of the firms after equitization and 
hesitate to remove the debt.  
Fourth, the creditors are not allowed to participate into the equitization plan establishment 
and approval. According to the Circular No. 126/2004/TT-BTC, the plan is designed by 
consulting board and approved by the Equitization Steering Committee which will be 
reported to relevant government agencies. The creditors, therefore, cannot involve in the 
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firms’ financial, business and labor plan. Therefore, they do not have even necessary 
information about the performance of the firms after equitization and are not sure if removing 
the debt is beneficial to them. 
Obviously, the above disadvantageous legal regulation gave DTAC limited rights to 
discuss with insolvent firms’ creditors.  
3.2.4. Issuing few incentives for investors to become shareholders of SOEs 
   Although the government already announced a recent policy of reducing the dominant 
role of the government as the major shareholder in SOEs in 2011, it still tries to maintain the 
major shares in SOEs. In details, the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 14/2011/QĐ-TTg dated 
14 March 2011 on the Criteria and Categories of the SOEs which are 100% owned by the 
state emphasized that the government would keep dominant shares in only some key areas 
has been issued. However, the long list of firms which must be 100% and more than 50% 
owned by the state still raises questions. The state still hold 100% of charter capital in 
enterprises managing infrastructure systems such as the national railways, airlines, post, 
lottery, newspapers, cigarette, urban areas, airports, important and large-scale seaports, radio 
and television stations…. Enterprises that the state continues to hold 50% of their charter 
capital include businesses that produce public products like media outlets, movies production 
for children, scientific and documentary purposes, urban waste water system, vaccine, 
lighting companies, agro-businesses, large-scale power plants (above 500 MW), fertilizers, 
coffee and rubber growing and production. In this decision, there has not been clear whether 
the government wishes to protect and develop the state properties or obtain an efficient state 
capital structure in SOEs.  
One of the most concerning issue now is that as the dominant shares are held by the state, 
it is time-consuming and sometimes difficult to select the board of directors, apply new 
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technology and new management system to the firms. Important changes in personal 
organization and investment are decided by the government. When the investors have little 
chance to manage or participate into the operation of the firms, they have few incentives to 
invest into the firms.  
Furthermore, in order to maintain the dominant shares, the government restricts the 
number of shares to be sold. Big SOEs’ IPO plans are heavily controlled by the government. 
Recently in June 2011, “Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung has approved a plan to 
equitize Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation (Petrolimex), which controls 60% of the 
country’s fuel distribution network. As in most cases, the government would still keep a 
controlling stake. It allowed Petrolimex to sell [only] a 2.56 percent stake at an IPO, while 
the government would still own 75% in longer term. The approval gave no details on the 
timing or possibility of foreign participation.” 34  Such a small percentage attracts few 
investors and makes both domestic and foreign investors doubt the government’s intention of 
giving up its controlling role. 
Finally, while sellers always expect the state enterprises’ assets to be highly valued, 
government agencies are always afraid of selling state’s assets cheaply.  According to the 
SaiGon Times, on the market, there are more than 70%35 of the shares are offered at the 
prices below its true value which give few incentives to investors. 
                                                          
34Tuoi tre, “Government approves Petrolimex equitization plan”, Tuoi tre Newspaper Online, 
June 02, 2011, http://www.tuoitrenews.vn/cmlink/tuoitrenews/business/gov-t-approves-
petrolimex-equitization-plan-1.33072, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
35 The data about the price of the equitized firms’ shares on the market is reorganized from 
the article by Ho ba Tinh, “Slow equitization due to IPO problems”, the SaiGon Times, July 
25 2011, www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/taichinh/chungkhoan/57644/Co-phan-hoa-cham-vi-
IPO?.html, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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3.2.5. Applying strict financial supervision to SOEs 
According to the Enterprise Finance Agency under MOF, by the end of the third quarter 
of 2011, the SEGs and SOEs will be put under the Financial Supervision Regulation which 
has just been completed36. The government’s point is that as many enterprises are using state 
capital, it is important to supervise carefully how the capital is used. SOEs now control 70% 
state fixed assets, 20% investment capital, 50% state investment capital, 60% bank credit and 
70% ODA capital.37 
The Regulation is applied to all SEGs, SCs, and limited liability companies under line 
ministries, the People’s Committee of provinces and the cities under the central government, 
the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), the enterprises partially owned by the state.  
There are 22 SCs and SEGs38 which are regulated by this regulation39. This regulation has 
several following problems.  
                                                          
36 The drafting version of the Regulation was reported to the Prime Minister by Ministry of 
Finance in April 2012.  
37 The data about SOEs’ capital is reorganized from the article by MOF “Managing the 
Finance of SOEs: Improving the responsibility of SOEs in managing and using the State’s 
capital and assets”, MOF’s website, 07 July 2011, 
http://taisancong.mof.gov.vn/portal/pls/portal/SHARED_APP.UTILS.print_preview?p_page_
url=http%3A%2F%2Ftaisancong.mof.gov.vn%2Fportal%2Fpage%2Fportal%2Fcqlcs%2F33
11156%2FTab&p_itemid=7064814&p_siteid=33&p_persid=0&p_language=vi, the original 
article is in Vietnamese. 
38 SEGs regulated by this Regulation: Vietnam Electricity Group (EVN), Vietnam Oil and 
Gas Group (PetroVietnam or PVN), Vietnam National Coal and Mineral Industries Group 
(VINACOMIN), Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT), Vietnam 
Shipbuilding Industrial Group (VINASHIN), Vietnam National Textile Garment 
Group  (VINATEX), VIETTEL Group, Song Da Holdings (the parent company of Vietnam 
Construction Industry Group)38, Vietnam Housing and Urban Development Group (HUD), 
Vietnam National Chemical Group (VinaChem), Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG); SCs: 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines). SCs regulated by this Regulation: Vietnam 
Airlines Corporation (Vietnam Airlines), Vietnam Railways (VNR), Viet Nam Cement 
Industry Corporation (Vicem), VietNam Steel Corporation (VNSteel), Vietnam Northern 
Food Corporation (VINAFOOD1), Vietnam Southern Food Corporation (VINAFOOD2), 
Vietnam National Coffee Corporation (VinaCafe), Vietnam Paper Corporation (VINAPACO), 
Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation (VINATABA), State Capital Investment Corporation 
(SCIC). 
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First are unfeasible criteria for supervision. The supervision criteria include investment 
projects, investment capital, investment efficiency, debt management, solvency, capital 
preservation and development, performance, profit/ state equity ratio. However, these are 
general criteria. It is difficult to supervise the capital preservation and development status 
without specific criteria. One of the criteria which is now in consideration is the annual profit 
must follow an increasing trend. However, this is difficult for any enterprises to keep 
increasing profit every year. Besides, it is impractical to make administrative agencies 
supervise firms, with a regulated set of criteria, so that firms operate beneficially to itself. 
Following a set of criteria is a burden to firms and an obstacle to its making profit. 
Next, the regulation is applied to the enterprises which is controlled less than 50% by the 
state (according to SOEs Law, they are not SOEs). These enterprises will be supervised in a 
number of areas including charter capital change, invested projects, valuable assets 
transaction. However, it is unreasonable to supervise those whom are less than 50% 
controlled by the government. Moreover, according to the Enterprise Law, the decision role 
belongs to those who control the major shares of the enterprises. If the government tries to 
control all enterprises having state equity, the roles and rights of the major shares holders will 
be violated. On the other hand, it is a heavy task for the supervision agencies to supervise 
such a big number of enterprises.  
Another problem of the regulation is the cooperation of different financial management 
agencies including MOF, the Authorities of Finance in provincial governments and Ministers 
of line ministries and the owners including line ministries, People’s Committees and SCIC in 
supervising SOEs’ financial status. Under this regulation, line ministries have to supervise the 
financial status of the enterprises with the role of owners while Ministers supervise them with 
the role of financial supervisor. This can cause confusion in responsibilities of line ministries, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
39 The drafting Regulation does not explain the criteria to put these SEGs and SCs into the list. 
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especially when it is not clear how the financial agencies can cooperate with the line 
ministries. Moreover, line ministries do not have enough expertise in supervising the 
production, investment activities and financial status of the firms. Therefore, it is difficult for 
them to act as normal owners and investors in non-SOEs. 
The next problem of the regulation is that when the enterprises have the signals of 
“unsafe financial status”, they will be put under “special supervision.” The signals are 
measured in debt, loss and solvency such as debt/equity ratio higher than three (3), solvency 
index smaller than 0.5%. Those who fail to establish budget provision plan or allocate budget 
properly which affects the enterprises’ performance, or send inaccurate reports on financial 
status will be put under the same condition. These “specially-supervised” enterprises have to 
report to the supervisor quarterly. Serious cases can be reported to the Prime Minister. They 
will be put out of this status after two years sending all required reports or recovering the loss. 
This is a burden to many SOEs, especially the construction companies who are put under 
special supervision as they have to work on priority constructions given by the government 
and have to mobilize capital from customers.  
All these government’s heavy intervention implied a long-term control over SOEs 
regardless of by whom the firms were owned. This obviously caused worries to major shares 
holders. Investors, therefore, have got few incentives to invest into these enterprises. 
3.3. SOEs’ significant weaknesses during last decades 
Although SOEs had certain contribution to the national development, they showed a 
huge number of significant weaknesses from their establishment to the recent time. 
In the early 1990s, the purpose of establishing SCs were to separate the state 
management and production activities. In another word, SCs replaced People’s Committees, 
ministries and other government agencies in managing production activities. Therefore, in 
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many cases, SCs were just another form of administration agencies which could not promote 
production and efficient cooperation among SCs’ members. 
Later, when being transferred to parent-subsidiary form, SOEs also faced difficulties. 
Due to the shortage of investment capital, many parent companies could not invest into their 
member ones. Moreover, parent companies have not been able to accomplish production and 
investment functions at the same time. 
After the restructuring program, SOEs still show a number of weaknesses. First was 
the small scale with irrational structure which led to lack of focus in key economic areas. 
Until 2005, “[o]n average, each [enterprise’s value was] only VND 22 billion, 58.9% [of 
which was] less than VND 5 billion.”40 Second was the backward technology together with 
weak management capacity, autonomy and accountability in business and production. 
“According to…the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), [Vietnam’s] technology 
[in SOEs] was from ten to twenty years behind that of other countries [in 2005].”41 Third was 
the inadequate management capacity of most SOEs due to the unclear fundamental rights 
applied to SOEs. Last was the “low efficiency and competitiveness, [including] rising 
overdue debt and [a high rate] of unemployed and redundant employees… In 2000, the 
numbers of profitable enterprises accounted for just over 40%, break-even ones…31%, and 
chronically loss-making ones… 29%.”42  
Until now, there is still limited improvement among SOEs. The Government Inspectorate 
of Vietnam (GI) has reported that in 2010 there has been lack of transparency in enterprise 
valuation, unclear structure of governance mechanisms and great loss of state property during 
                                                          
40Tran Ngoc Phuong, Standing Vice Chairman, Ho Chi Minh City’s Enterprise Reform and 
Management Board. Reform of State Owned Enterprises in the Context of Vietnam’s WTO 
Accession, (working paper, WBI-Training Program with World Bank, 2005), 2-4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
 37 
 
the equitization process of a number of big SOEs. In addition, according to the report of 
Enterprise Reform and Development Steering Committee dated 15 Feb 2011, “equity size of 
SEGs and SOEs is VND 540,701 billion ($US 25,000 million) which shows an increase of 
11.75% in comparison to that of 2009. The total profit before tax is VND 70,778 billion ($US 
3,500 million). So the ratio of profit before tax over equity is only 13.1% which is even much 
lower than the interest rate of commercial banks [the year before]. Moreover, 80% of the 
profit before tax is from only four SEGs, which are Oil and Gas Group (PVN), Viettel Group, 
Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications (VNPT) and Vietnam Rubber Group.” 43 It is easy to 
estimate that the ratio in all other SEGs and SOEs must be lower than 13%. This is a serious 
weakness of SOEs. As SOEs controlled all major sectors of the economy, their inefficiency 
could seriously harm the national economic stability and growth.  
 
                                                          
43  Nguyen Minh Phong, PhD., Hanoi Socio-Economic Development Research Institute, 
“Developing SEGs: three bottlenecks,” Bao moi newspaper, 08 July 2011, 
http://www.baomoi.com/Phat-trien-tap-doan-kinh-te-nha-nuoc--Ba-nut-that-kho-
go/45/6572669.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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CHAPTER IV: GOVERNMENT’S SPECIAL PREFERENCES AND 
INTERVENTION INTO VINASHIN AND ITS RISKY BEHAVIOR 
In this chapter, the author will analyze the data of the case of VINASHIN to see if it is 
consistent with the main hypothesis and rejects the alternative one. 
Again, the proposition (1) is: 
Financial Backing +  Top- down Intervention  = Careless Decision + Passive 
Management  
 
The proposition (2) is: 
Capable Leadership + Financial Backing + Top-down Intervention = Careful Decision 
+ Active Management 
 
4.1. Government’s special preferences to VINASHIN and the  limited role of its 
CEO 
The policies of the government toward VINASHIN and the way it directed 
VINASHIN demonstrates the left hand side of the proposition (1): 
Financial Backing +  Top- down Intervention   
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These policies also show that the left hand side of the proposition (2) cannot happen: 
Capable Leadership + Financial Backing + Top- down Intervention  
 
4.1.1. Government’s special preferences to VINASHIN  
From the early establishment to the insolvency and restructuring, VINASHIN has 
received a number of privilege rights from the government. Most important advantages 
VINASHIN has gained are in financial resources and auditing schedule.44 
The first advantage of VINASHIN was getting huge preferential loans from both 
domestic and international banks. One year after the decision of VINASHIN establishment 
by the Prime Minister, “VINASHIN could mobilize 70,700 billion VND (4.406 billion $US), 
43,700 billion VND (2.723 billion $US) of which was from long-term loans…This happened 
during the most difficult time for almost all enterprises in Vietnam to get access to 
loans.”45The explained reason for this support was that VINASHIN played the single and 
most important role in ship-building industry which the government has always considered 
the key to boost the economy. 
The first source of capital was “the loan of 750 million $US from the government 
bonds to the international market, which was issued following the Decision No. 914 dated 01  
September 2005 by the Prime Minister for the purposes of modernization and technology 
                                                          
44 If putting aside the aspect of interest group, it could be implied that when the 
government gave VINASHIN at the same time easy loans and a comfortable auditing 
schedule, the government already assumed that with its direction, VINASHIN would use the 
loans effectively to realize the policy goals and therefore would not need a tight auditing 
schedule. 
45  Phung Suong, “VINASHIN’s debts,” Tien Phong Newspaper, ", 2010, 
http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/190099/Can-canh-con-tau-Vinashin-Tap-doan-2N-Nong-
va-no.html, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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advancement.”46 When the government utilized its credibility on the international market, the 
government meant it would share the risk with VINASHIN. In details, “Vietnamese 
government’s bonds were issued on 03 November 2005 at the interest rate of 6.875 %/year 
which would falls due on 15 January 2016 and paid interest every six months. In order to get 
this loan, the borrower had to pay international bond issue fee of 168 billion VND (10.47 
million $US).”47 Moreover, the procedure from issuing the policy to delivering the loans to 
VINASHIN was conducted in a short time. This gave VINASHIN important advantages as it 
could always mobilize sufficient capital for production and mobilize the capital in time to 
take hold of valuable opportunities in the market. 
The second source of capital was the “loans from 15 banks and two funds abroad, the 
total amount of which was 600 million $US, arranged by the Credit Suisse Singapore 
following the permit by the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) dated 22 June 2007…VINASHIN 
received the loans on 25 June 2007 with libor interest paid every six months plus an annual 
interest of 1.5%. The principal must be paid every six months and paid 60 million $US each 
time… In order to get this loan, the borrower had to pay eight million $US for credit 
arrangements.”48 The permit from SBV meant an implicit agreement between the government 
and VINASHIN. Believing that the government would be responsible for VINASHIN’s debt, 
creditors gave VINASHIN easiest access to loans. 
As the government utilized its credibility to support VINASHIN in the international 
financial market, it is no surprise that it continued to support VINASHIN in the domestic one. 
The third great source of capital for VINASHIN was from “six issues of domestic bonds. The 
first three issues included 500 billion VND (31.3 million $US) (September 2006) and 300 
billion VND (18.83 million $US) (November 2006) at an annual interest of 9.6%, [in which] 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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500 billion VND (31.3 million $US) (January 2007) at an annual interest of 10.5%, principles 
must be paid after five years. The forth issue was 1000 billion VND (18 January 2007) at an 
annual interest of 10.5%, principles must be paid after ten years… [The fifth and sixth issues 
were in total] 3000 billion VND.” 49  The loans from government’s bonds came out 
continuously to support VINASHIN. Therefore, the firm had never been worried about 
financial sources. Moreover, the government had been always backing up VINASHIN and 
trying to meet its financial demand. In addition to the financial sources from the government, 
VINASHIN also borrowed from various banks, “the total number of which was 13,672 
billion VND (852.16 million $US).”50 
In addition to financial support, VINASHIN also received preferential in auditing 
schedule. The auditing plan for VINASHIN was delayed several times from 2006 to 2010 
which was also due to the government’s efforts in giving VINASHIN favorable conditions to 
focus on production. This attitude of the government showed that the government was 
confident that VINASHIN would follow the government’s direction and policies and that 
VINASHIN’s rapid development was beneficial to the whole economy. This is why the 
government gave VINASHIN all best conditions and protection.  
The explained reason for this delay was the number of SOEs was so big that “auditing 
must be conducted at every four to five years.”51 Next, SAO planned to audit VINASHIN in 
2008 while the Government Inspectorate (GI) already put VINASHIN in its 2009 plan. In 
order to avoid duplication, SAO had to reschedule the plan to 2010. However, after that, the 
plan made by the GI in 2009 was not approved and was moved to 2010 as VINASHIN 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51  The data about auditing postponement is reorganized from the article by Le Nhung, 
“Auditing Schedule has been postponed many times,” Viet bao Newspaper, October 25, 2010, 
http://pda.vietbao.vn/Chinh-Tri/Nhieu-lan-len-ke-hoach-kiem-toan-Vinashin-nhung-deu-bi-
cat/20944289/96/, the original article is in Vietnamese, the information was from the 
interview with the Chief of the State Auditing. 
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needed to concentrate on production. This idea was also in the report of the National 
Assembly’s Committee of Finance and Budget52. Again, this explanation implied that the 
intention of all auditing postponement was to let VINASHIN focus on its production. With 
all these efforts, the government expected VINASHIN to utilize its advantages and advance 
its performance as well as efficiency. 
4.1.2. Limited role of VINASHIN’s CEO 
In addition to giving a number of preferences to VINASHIN, the government also 
gave this SEG frequent orders and directions, believing that VINASHIN can utilize its 
advantages reasonably. The paradox is that while the government has been trying to give 
VINASHIN financial support and protection, the government has also required VINASHIN 
to sever as a policy tool rather than a firm. Under this condition, VINASHIN’s CEO must 
work to realize directed policies. There have been few incentives for the CEO of the SEG to 
utilize his ability to improve firm’s efficiency. 
Like many other SOEs, VINASHIN was a SC 91 in 1996. It was reorganized to be a 
SEG in 2006. The CEO of VINASHIN was assigned by the Prime Minister. From this point, 
CEO of VINASHIN or other SOEs tend to be the person who has the incentives to get 
promotion better than interested in ship-building business.  
Like other SOEs, VINASHIN has the Board of Directors (BOD) with its chairman to 
work as supervisors. However, the CEO and chairman of VINASHIN before its insolvency 
was actually one person. It looked like the CEO of VINASHIN had more power. However, 
like other SOEs, the BOD of VINASHIN is regulated to be responsible before the Prime 
Minister and the government. 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
 43 
 
VINASHIN was established by the government as a policy tool to turn ship-building 
industry into a key industry which can be a main driving force for Vietnam’s development. 
At that time, Korea, Japan and China had already advantages in shipbuilding in Asia. This 
task was quite challenging to a newborn ship-building group.  
During the first years of VINASHIN’s establishment (2006-2007) there were a 
number of contracts of ship-building. VINASHIN appeared to grow well and make profit for 
two years. This early time made the government believe strongly in VINASHIN’s positive 
future as well as their support and direction to VINASHIN. 
In each period of time, VINASHIN received important and demanding orders. One of 
the most noticeable examples was establishing the North-South high-speed sea route for 
Vietnam. This order was realized by VINASHIN’s purchasing expensive but inefficient 
Lotus (Hoa Sen) ship which will be studied in details in the parts afterward.  
From the early establishment to recent time, VINASHIN was put under top-down 
orders which did not take into account profit and efficiency. As long as the government’s 
policies could be implemented, the firm would receive relevant financial support. This 
mechanism led to a passive management system for VINASHIN’s leadership. They were 
dependent on the direction of the government while the government itself considered the firm 
one policy instrument. There was an implicit agreement for the government and VINASHIN. 
The firm believed that as long as it followed the government’s direction to practice its 
policies, it would be well supported. The government believed that as long as the government 
directed the firm toward government’s policies and goals and supported it financially, it 
would be able to realize those policies. However, there is a gap between these two 
assumptions. Both two sides have not paid attention to the firm’s efficient operation while 
without efficiency, the firm could not secure its existence, and therefore not healthy enough 
to realize any policy. 
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The administrative management affected the leadership of the firm heavily and turned 
them into pure policy practitioners. When VINASHIN’s board of directors were accused of 
letting VINASHIN fell into huge debt in the court in 201253, all the defendants except from 
the CEO claimed that they only followed the orders of higher leadership. Even the CEO of 
VINASHIN claimed that he was just overexcited to realize the order of the government to set 
up the high-speed North-South sea route. Moreover, the government’s order to develop the 
shipping industry was an extremely challenging order that he faced a number of difficulties in 
making fast and proper decisions to grasp valuable opportunities. 
 What should be more noticed is that not only the VINASHIN’s leaders but the court 
itself was judging if VINASHIN leadership followed or missed some parts of the 
government’s orders. This implies that the role of the board of directors of the firms is to 
realize the order as closely as possible. Concentrating on how to follow all orders tightly, the 
board of directors could assume that following orders means little responsibility for 
themselves. In another word, there would always be higher leadership who are responsible 
for what they do.  
4.2. VINASHIN’s risk-taking behavior 
The following risk-taking behavior of VINASHIN will demonstrate the right hand 
side of the proposition (1):  
Careless Decision + Passive Management 
 
VINASHIN’s behavior also shows that the right hand side of proposition (2) cannot 
happen: 
                                                          
53  The court was publicized on the Law Newspaper online, 30 Aug. 2012, 
http://phapluattp.vn/20120827065220404p1063c1016/cuu-chu-tich-vinashin-xin-giam-nhe-
hinh-phat.htm 
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Careful Decision + Active Management 
 
Different from the government’s expectation, VINASHIN induced high level of risk-
taking behavior. As VINASHIN received tremendous support and close direction from the 
government, it conducted careless investment decision, thinking that the government would 
always stand behind it. It also relied heavily on the government’s direction and made light of 
the role of making profit and operating as an efficient ship-builder. 
4.2.1.  Investing into a number of areas which are not relevant to its focusing area 
The most serious and most risky behavior of VINASHIN is to spread its investment 
into various areas including insurance, plane rental, iron and oil manufacturing and housing. 
First, according to MOF, VINASHIN spent huge resources for financial investment. 
One year after establishment, VINASHIN’s long-term financial investment reached a huge 
number 4,103 billion VND (255.73 million $US) including 615 billion VND (38.33 million 
$US) investing into various joint-venture companies and 3,488 billion VND (217.40 million 
$US) for stocks and shares investment.  
One of the biggest stocks investments was that of 1,462 billion VND (91.12 million 
$US) into Bao Viet Insurance Group. The reason that VINASHIN claimed for the investment 
into Bao Viet Group was that ship-building was a risky sector. Besides, VINASHIN spent 70 
billion VND (4.36 million $US) to purchase the stocks of Plane Rental Joint Stock Company 
(JSC) which is totally unrelated to ship-building area. 
Next, the parent company of VINASHIN invested 120 billion VND (7.4 million $US) 
into Vietnam Development Fund and another same amount to Thach Khe Iron JSC. It also 
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invested 80 billion VND (4.9 million $US) into Oil Rig Manufacturing JSC and 91 billion 
VND (5.6 million $US) to Hanoi Housing Commercial Bank54.  
All these investment was made in a short period of time and continuously. 
VINASHIN has shown its huge ambition in becoming a big economic group in various areas, 
many of which are quite irrelevant to its major area. This behavior is excessively risky to a 
newborn SEG like VINASHIN, who had not got remarkable success even in its major area. 
Finally, VINASHIN induced not only risky but harmful behavior to its production when 
trying to provide capital to its subsidiaries from its loans at higher interest rate. “The loan 
from the government’s bonds issued to the international market was borrowed by 
VINASHIN’s subsidiaries at 2.96% higher than the original interest rate while other loans 
were borrowed at two percent (2%) to three percent (3%) higher. This increased the 
production costs and reduced the competitiveness as well as productivity of these 
subsidiaries.”55 By this way, VINASHIN misused the loans guaranteed by the government’s 
credibility since it worked as a bank for its subsidiaries.  
4.2.2. Investing into a big number of projects despite already having big debt 
According to GI’s report, “from the end of 2005 to 30 June 2010, VINASHIN 
mobilized huge capital resources domestically and internationally including government’s 
bonds to international market, enterprises’ bonds and other sources [and] the total value of 
which was 72,000 billion VND (4,487.65 million $US)…However, as VINASHIN spread its 
investment into a huge number of projects (615 projects), each project got only 30% of the 
                                                          
54  The data about VINASHIN’s investment is reorganized from the article on Vietnam 
Economic Forum, “VINASHIN was bold in using capital”, Vietnam Economic Forum 
website, July 05 2010, vef.vn/2010-07-05-vinashin-long-hanh-trong-viec-su-dung-dong-von-, 
the original article is in Vietnamese. 
55  Phung Suong, “VINASHIN’s debts,” Tien Phong Newspaper, March 31, 2010, 
http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/190099/Can-canh-con-tau-Vinashin-Tap-doan-2N-Nong-
va-no.html, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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required capital on average…”56 As a result, many projects were uncompleted and abandoned. 
After quite a long time, most of the assets were damaged which led to huge losses.  
Moreover, also according to GI’s report, the 750 million $US from government bonds 
was divided into various small amounts for 219 projects. Many among these projects were 
still on progress at the time of inspection. Therefore, until the end of 2008, there were only 56 
completed projects. There was 75% of the total number of the projects were incomplete or 
not yet operated.57  
Due to this risky investment behavior, VINASHIN could not be capable to fulfill its 
major function as a ship-builder.  It had to give up a number of orders and contracts due to its 
lack of capital and capacity. The number of ship-building firm orders until 31 March 2009 
was 173, the total value of which was more than four billion $US. However, there were 14 
order cancelations, the total value of which was 392.29 million $US and 32 postponement, 
the total value of which was 696.97 million $US.58 Even when the orders were already firmly 
set and signed in contracts, VINASHIN also had to cancel and postpone the contracts. Also 
according to GI’s report, from 2006 to 2010, VINASHIN signed 85 contracts, the total value 
of which was 58,224 billion VND (3,653 billion $US). However, there were only 15 
contracts completed, accounting for 12% of the signed projects. Cancelled and planned to be 
                                                          
56 Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 
07, 2011, http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-
tra-tai-Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in 
Vietnamese. 
57 The data about VINASHIN’s investment is reorganized from the article on the report of the 
Government Inspectorate of Vietnam by Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 
96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 07, 2011, 
http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-tra-tai-
Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
58 The data about VINASHIN’s order cancelation is reorganized from the article on Voice of 
Vietnam, “VINASHIN’s Spread Usage of Investment,” Vietnam Economics Forum, July 05, 
2010, http://vef.vn/2010-07-05-vinashin-long-hanh-trong-viec-su-dung-dong-von-, the 
original article is in Vietnamese. 
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cancelled projects accounted for 47%, which were the share of 54 ships of a total value of 
27,223 billion VND (1,709 billion $US).59  
VINASHIN’s risk-taking behavior became serious when a number of its proposed 
projects for loans were only theoretical ideas. When coming to practical situation, 
VINASHIN failed to operate all the ideas that it created. [In 2008], “most of the major 
subsidiaries of VINASHIN were in lack of capital…”60 Details about the lack of capital 
resources among VINASHIN’s subsidiaries are in the following table:  
Table 4: Lack of capital in VINASHIN’s subsidiaries  
Source: The data was reorganized from the article by Cong Minh and Phung Suong “A 
closer look at VINASHIN: strange public management”, Tien Phong Newspapers, March 31 
2010, http://www.tienphong.vn/Kinh-Te/190308/Can-canh-con-tau-Vinashin-Quan-ly-cong-
no-la-lung.html 
Subsidiary company name Lack of capital in billion 
VND 
Lack of capital in million 
USD (exchange rate at the 
time the subsidiary was 
invested 1$US=17440 
VND) 
Nha Trang Shipbuilding 
Company 
891 51.08 
Cai Lan Shipbuilding 
Company 
495 28.4 
                                                          
59 The data about VINASHIN’s contracts is reorganized from the article on the report of the 
Government Inspectorate of Vietnam by Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 
96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 07, 2011, 
http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-tra-tai-
Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
60 Cong Minh and Phung Suong “A closer look at VINASHIN: strange public management”, 
Tien Phong Newspapers, March 31 2010, http://www.tienphong.vn/Kinh-Te/190308/Can-
canh-con-tau-Vinashin-Quan-ly-cong-no-la-lung.html, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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Bach Dang SC 2,400 137.6 
Nam Trieu SC 3,982 228 
Pha Rung Shipbuilding 
Company 
3,749 226.3 
4.2.3. Purchasing ships with little judgment 
In a short period of time, VINASHIN imported a large number of old ships from other 
countries with little judgment. According to GI, “from 2006 to 2009, VINASHIN bought 25 
old ships, the total value of which was more than 8000 billion VND…[VINASHIN] induced 
a huge loss of 550 billion VND for Lotus (Hoa Sen) ship which was advertised by 
VINASHIN as a five-star ship.”61 One of the examples is that in just one year, from 2006 to 
2007, VINASHIN approved 10 contracts of buying foreign ships proposed by its subsidiary, 
VINASHIN Ocean Shipping Company Limited (VINASHIN LINES62 or Vien Duong in 
Vietnamese) as the following: 
                                                          
61 Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 
07, 2011,  http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-
tra-tai-Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in 
Vietnamese. 
62 Later in the restructuring program, VINASHIN LINES was moved to VINALINES 
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Table 5: Foreign ships bought by VINASHIN and their value 
Source: Hundreds of millions of $US and old ships, Tien Phong 
Newspapers, http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/190223/Dau-tu-hang-tram-trieu-do-
%E2%80%9Com%E2%80%9D-tau-qua-dat.html 
No. Ship name Investment Time Ship 
age 
Nation63 
Billion 
VND 
Million $US (exchange 
rate at transaction time) 
1.        Vinashin Island 174.4 10.94 2006 26 Panama 
2.        Vinashin Summer 109 6.84 2006 23 Tuvalu 
3.        Vinashin Eagle 220.8 13.85 2006 24 Tuvalu 
4.        Vinashin Phoenix 408.6 25.46 2007 22 Liveria 
5.        Vinashin Express 1 234 14.58 2007 20 Liveria 
6.        Vinashin Express 2 245.9 15.32 2007 19 Liveria 
7.        Vinashin Glory 505.4 31.50 2007 24 Tuvalu 
8.        Vinashin Tiger 328.2 20.45 2007 26 Tuvalu 
9.        Vinashin Atlantic 909.6 56.69 2007 15 Panama 
 
 
                                                          
63 These ships had to keep foreign flags as they were not certified by Vietnam’s Agency for 
Registration. 
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“[Among these ships], those of 23 and 24 years old were bought using the loans from 
the government’s bonds to the international market, the total value of which was 329 billion 
VND (20.5 million $US). [The rest of the ships] were also bought using loans.”64  
Purchasing old ships would not be a wrong decision if old ships could still bring profit. 
In some developing stages, old ships could be bought at cheap prices, repaired and later 
brought profit. However, VINASHIN made careless investment in purchasing old ships due 
to lack of technical information collection as well as managing the ships after purchasing 
them. In particular, comparing the prices VINASHIN paid to buy these old ships with the 
market price and profit made after investment, it is obvious that VINASHIN made huge 
losses. The ships bought by VINASHIN can be divided into two groups:  
First are those who could not operate properly right after being purchased including 
Vinashin Island, Vinashin Summer, Vinashin Express 1, Vinashin Express 2, Vinashin Glory 
and Vinashin Tiger. They have been sold as scrap iron.  
Second are those who have been valued at much lower price than when it was bought. 
Vinashin Eagle was bought at 220.8 billion VND while it has been now valued at 60 billion 
VND. The Vinashin Phonenix was bought at 408.6 billion VND. It has been recently valued 
at 100 billion VND.65  
Next, the paper would like to look in details at several noticeable cases of old ship 
purchased by VINASHIN as the following: 
                                                          
64  Bao moi, “VINASHIN’s old ships,” Bao moi Newspaper, July 15, 2012, 
http://www.baomoi.com/Home/KinhTe/daidoanket.vn/Vinashin-Nhung-con-tau-nat-Ky-
2/4559855.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
65  The data about these old ships’ value is reorganized from the article by Bao moi, 
“VINASHIN’s old ships,” Bao moi Newspaper, July 15, 2012, 
http://www.baomoi.com/Home/KinhTe/daidoanket.vn/Vinashin-Nhung-con-tau-nat-Ky-
2/4559855.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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[VINASHIN Atlantic] 
 VINASHIN bought Vinashin Atlantic and assigned VINASHIN LINES, its 
subsidiary to manage the ship while VINASHIN LINES had little experience in managing 
oil-carrying ships and had few qualified sailors to work on the ship. Therefore, VINASHIN 
LINES had to hire experts and sailors from a foreign company which partially increased the 
managing costs. The profit the ship brought was too low comparing to the costs. The situation 
became serious when the company hired to maintain the ship canceled the service in April 
2009. Therefore, the ship was quickly damaged and could not operate until now.  
 [Lash Song Gianh] 
In addition to spending a huge capital to purchase old ships, VINASHIN also invested 
in its major function as ship-building. However, a number of them also made losses. Lash 
Song Gianh was an important case as VINASHIN invested 400 billion VND (25.1 million 
$US) in 2005. VINASHIN used old technology of 1950 which required a large amount of 
fuel with disqualified speed. Therefore, it brought negative profit.  Recently, the ship could 
not be used for any other purpose other than be sold to scrap dealers which could bring only 
50 billion VND (3.1 million $US). When being transferred to VINALINES the ship was 
repaired but still could not satisfy the market’s demand.66  
[Bach Dang Giang] 
Another ship is Bach Dang Giang in which VINASHIN invested more than 155 
billion VND (9.73 million $US). Nam Trieu, a subsidiary of VINASHIN received the ship 
from VINASHIN LINES. This ship was imported by Ship’s Components Importing 
Company in 2000. Nam Trieu had to invest 13 billion VND (0.8 million $US) into repairing 
                                                          
66  Bao moi, “VINASHIN’s old ships,” Bao moi Newspaper, July 15, 2012, 
http://www.baomoi.com/Home/KinhTe/daidoanket.vn/Vinashin-Nhung-con-tau-nat-Ky-
2/4559855.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
 
 53 
 
the ship…The total investment of 168 billion VND (10.54 $US) was from loan VINASHIN 
got from the government’s bonds to the international market. However, after all, the ship 
could not work due to old age and damaged engine. Therefore, Nam Trieu intended to turn it 
into a floating four-star hotel with an investment of 144 billion VND (9.3 million $US). 
However, the idea could not be realized as the ship was quickly degraded. Nam Trieu had to 
sell the ship’s frame as scrap and sell the ship engine separately. Nam Trieu got back only 
more than 66 billion VND (4.1 million $US).67  
[Lotus] 
This important ship purchase case was questioned the court in 2012. However, the 
CEO of VINASHIN explained that he just followed the policy and order of the government 
but practice it with several mistakes due to the objective context. This case is the obvious 
evidence for the misleading perception of the government and VINASHIN toward each other. 
While the government gave VINASHIN its best support, hoping VINASHIN to realize its 
policy successfully, VINASHIN leadership passively relied on the government’s direction 
and made decision without thinking of feasibility and profit. It is easier to see this behavior in 
the following table: 
Table 6: From the government’s order to VINASHIN’s realizing the order in 
purchasing Lotus ship 
Source: The table was drawn based on the data collected and reorganized from the following 
articles: 
- The article by Bao moi, “VINASHIN’s old ships,” Bao moi Newspaper, July 15, 
2012, http://www.baomoi.com/Home/KinhTe/daidoanket.vn/Vinashin-Nhung-con-tau-
nat-Ky-2/4559855.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese; 
                                                          
67 The data about Nam Trieu is reorganized from the article by Bao Son, “VINASHIN court,” 
Hochiminh Security Newspaper, March, 30, 2012, 
http://www.congan.com.vn/?mod=detnews&catid=703&id=466648, the original article is in 
Vietnamese. 
 54 
 
- The article by Hoang Sang, “purchasing thousand-of-billion ship for testing”, 
Vietnam Net Newspaper Online, March 27 2012, http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/xa-
hoi/65993/vu-vinashin--mua-tau-nghin-ty-de----thu-nghiem.html, the original article 
is in Vietnamese. 
Government’s order Government’s support 
Establishing North-South transportation 
seaway 
Giving loans with low interest 
 
 
VINASHIN realizes the order 
Making fast decision: Buying “Lotus” in 2007 (the ship was made in Italy) 
with a price of 1,500,000 billion VND (95,932 million $US) (original price when 
purchasing the ship is 60 million EU) 
 
 
Consequence 
Huge costs for repairing in China and Korea : 300,000 $US 
Huge losses in each transportation  
The ship was abandoned after several voyages  
 
From the example, it is clear that the board of directors did not make careful and wise 
decision. They did not count basic economic element including profit, cost and losses in the 
purchase. In addition to their carelessness, the system that they were working it gave them 
few incentives to make the firm competitive while that system made them focus on doing the 
exact things that they were assigned to do. 
Due to the above risky investment, VINASHIN quickly fell in to huge debt. “…Since 
2006, VINASHIN had been always in extremely huge debt, more than 94% its equity…As 
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most of the debt was overdue, VINASHIN had to ask for other loans to pay previous debt. 
According to GI, the unbalanced status of VINASHIN had negative impact on the activities 
of a number of domestic banks and credit organizations as well as the government’s credit on 
the international capital market.”68 The following auditing report in 2009 will explain in 
details VINASHIN conducted risky investment behavior: 
 
                                                          
68 Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 
07, http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-tra-tai-
Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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Table 7: VINASHIN auditing report conducted by KPMG until 31 December 2009 
Source: VINASHIN’s huge debt, Economics News, quoted from the Sai Gon 
Times, http://www.tinkinhte.com/kien-thuc/quan-tri-tai-chinh/khong.nd5-
dt.126093.163169.html, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
Assets 31-12-2009   31-12-2008   
  Billion 
VND 
million $US Billion 
VND 
million $US 
Total Assets 102,536 5263.93 93,238 4786.59 
Current Assets 50,200 2577.13 44,991 2309.72 
Cash and Cash 
Equivalent 
3,642 186.97 2,686 137.89 
Short-term Investment 641 32.91 686 35.22 
Short-term Receivables 26,139 1341.91 21,869 1122.70 
Merchandise Inventory 18,187 933.67 15,950 818.83 
Others 1,559 80.03 3,798 194.98 
Long-term Assets 52,355 2687.77 48,247 2476.87 
Long-term Receivables 1,423 73.05 1,031 52.93 
Fixed Assets 42,495 2181.58 40,549 2081.677704 
(including on- Progress 
Construction Projects) 
20,041 1028.85 20,107 1032.24 
Invested Real Estate 342 17.56 6 0.31 
Long-term Investment 3,566 183.07 3,931 201.81 
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Others 4,507 231.38 2,728 140.05 
Total Liabilities and 
Owners' Equity  
102,536 5263.93 93,238 4786.59 
Liabilities 96,635 4960.98 88,512 4543.97 
Current Liabilities 48,290 2479.08 43,940 2255.76 
Long-term Liabilities 48,345 2481.90 44,572 2288.21 
Equity 5,900 302.89 4,726 242.62 
Owners’ Equity 4,689 240.72 3,552 182.35 
Minority Interest 1,211 62.17 1,174 60.27 
 
According to the report of KPMG Audit in the above table, “the total debt of 
VINASHIN until the end of 2009 was 96,635 billion VND (4.96 billion $US) … Nearly a 
half of the total value of the fixed assets (42,495 billion VND) was used to invest into on-
progress projects…In 2009, VINASHIN lost 1,628 billion VND (83.58 million $US) over a 
revenue of 22,461 billion VND (1.15 billion $US).”69 These results prove that VINASHIN 
did not pay enough attention to its debt as well as its responsibility to pay the debt. The way it 
made use of investment capital clearly shows that it invested into excessively various projects 
in a short time and lost the control over these projects. 
 
4.2.4. Establishing a big number of VINASHIN’s subsidiaries  
Being ambitious to become a giant group in a number of areas, VINASHIN quickly 
built up numerous subsidiaries. Only more than one year after establishment, VINASHIN 
                                                          
69  The Sai Gon Times, “VINASHIN’s huge debts,” Economics New, October 29, 2010, 
http://www.tinkinhte.com/kien-thuc/quan-tri-tai-chinh/khong.nd5-dt.126093.163169.html, 
the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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established 46 subsidiaries including 37 new subsidiaries70 and adopted nine companies from 
other groups. The number of VINASHIN’s subsidiaries increased every year. 
In 2007, “VINASHIN had 150 entities with 71,000 workers. [They are] parent 
company and its subsidiaries including 35 totally SOEs, 33 state-owned limited liability 
companies, 70 joint stock companies, seven schools and five joint venture companies.”71 
“From 2007 to 2008, VINASHIN created 200 more enterprises, many of which were not 
related to ship-building sector and lacked capital.” 72 This surely created more debt and 
lowered VINASHIN’s competitiveness in the ship-building market. 
The matter was that not only the parent company but many of VINASHIN’s 
subsidiaries also induced risky behavior including heavy investment into financial market. 
For example, Bach Dang Ship-building SC borrowed short-term loans from VINASHIN 
Finance Company (another subsidiary of VINASHIN) to buy shares from other subsidiaries, 
the total amount of which was more than 58 billion VND (3.6 million $US) though it was in 
huge debt. Another example was Pha Rung Ship-building Company. This company invested 
“61 billion VND (3.8 million $US) into stocks market, 24 million VND of which was from 
                                                          
70 The data about VINASHIN’s number of subsidiaries is reorganized from the article by 
Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 
07, 2011, http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-
tra-tai-Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in 
Vietnamese. 
71  Phung Suong, “VINASHIN’s debts,” Tien Phong Newspaper, March 31, 2010, 
http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/190099/Can-canh-con-tau-Vinashin-Tap-doan-2N-Nong-
va-no.html, the original article is in Vietnamese 
72 Thuy Nhai, “GI’s Report on VINASHIN’s debt of 96,000 billion VND,” GI’s website, June 
07, 2011, http://thanhtra.com.vn/tabid/77/newsid/41600/temidclicked/2/seo/Ket-luan-thanh-
tra-tai-Vinashin-No-den-hon-96000-ty-dong/Default.aspx, the original article is in 
Vietnamese. 
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short-term loans.”73 Pha Rung also invested two million $US into the establishment of Bai 
Can Joint Venture Company, which suffered huge losses shortly after its establishment.74 
4.3. The restructuring program 
4.3.1. Major changes to VINASHIN after the restructuring program 
According to the approval of the restructuring program by Prime Minister on 18 
November 2010, the plan had the following significant features: 
First, VINASHIN will focus in only three areas including ship-building, supporting 
industry for ship-building and training ship-building workers. 
Second, the duration for restructuring would be from 2011 to 2013 which is thought to 
give VINASHIN enough time to improve its personal, management and production. 
Third, “VINASHIN will act as a group of companies after the restructuring program...” In 
this new format, “parent company and subsidiaries are separated legal entities, separated 
capital and assets who have the rights to own, use and make decision on their assets ... The 
parent company is a limited liability company owned 100% by the State….”75 In addition, 
“VINASHIN must remove 216 companies together with 13,000 workers.... There would be 
[only] 43 companies remained…”76 
                                                          
73  Voice of Vietnam, “VINASHIN’s Spread Usage of Investment,” Vietnam Economics 
Forum, July 05, 2010, http://vef.vn/2010-07-05-vinashin-long-hanh-trong-viec-su-dung-
dong-von-, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
74 The data about the two subsidiaries of VINASHIN, Bach Dang and Pha Rung is organized 
from Voice of Vietnam, “VINASHIN’s Spread Usage of Investment,” Vietnam Economics 
Forum, July 05, 2010, http://vef.vn/2010-07-05-vinashin-long-hanh-trong-viec-su-dung-
dong-von-, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
75  Hong Anh, “VINASHIN Restructuring Plan was Approved,” Vnexpress Newspaper, 
November 19, 2010 http://vnexpress.net/gl/kinh-doanh/2010/11/3ba23264/, the original 
article is in Vietnamese. 
76  Huyen Han, “Publicizing VINASHIN restructuring plan,” Police Newspaper Online, 
November 20, 2010, http://www.cand.com.vn/News/PrintView.aspx?ID=140264, the original 
article is in Vietnamese. 
 60 
 
Fourth, “other enterprises who were VINASHIN’s subsidiaries could be equitized, 
sold, go through selling debt, debt equity swap, selling invested capital, dissolution and 
bankruptcy…Some entities would be moved to Petrol Vietnam (PVN)  and VINALINES.”77  
Finally, according to the Minister of Transportation78, after VINASHIN’s insolvency 
the intervention and supervision of the government has been much stricter than before. The 
government has assigned MOT to supervise and evaluate closely all VINASHIN’s objectives, 
master plan, organization and investment and report to the Prime Minister. 
Overall, VINASHIN will receive other amounts of financial sources from the 
government, put under closer supervision. Basically, the way the government direct the firm 
has not much changed. 
4.3.2. Remaining problems  
Although the government has tried to restructure VINASHIN, it repeated its financial 
support to VINASHIN. After two years, VINASHIN has not shown remarkable improvement 
while asking for more loans. 
After the restructuring plan, VINASHIN had to face to its debt to workers who had 
not received their salaries for a long time. “[Until 09/2010,] VINASHIN had nearly 35,000 
workers who had not received their salaries with the total amount of 102.6 billion VND 
(5.267 million $US)... VINASHIN had 42,200 workers, 35,800 of which were 
employed…and 6,400 workers were temporarily unemployed.”79 
                                                          
77 Ibid. 
78 The information about VINASHIN’s supervision is reorganized from the article by Anh 
Minh, “MOT will supervise VINASHIN tightly”, an interview with the Minister of 
Transportation, Investment Review, MPI, on  November 22, 2012, 
http://www.baodautu.vn/portal/public/vir/baivietkinhtedautu/repository/collaboration/sites%2
0content/live/vir/web%20contents/chude/kinhtedautu/chinhsachvimo/71dd7b947f000001019
9509462d15b33 
79 Ibid. 
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One of the most noticeable features of the restructuring plan was that government 
would continue to support VINASHIN after the restructuring plan. The most important 
support is continuing financial support for VINASHIN to pay its debt. At the beginning of 
2011, the government claimed its support to VINASHIN as the most important objective is 
“not to lose ship-building industry…There would be a decree about special mechanism for 
VINASHIN to restructure itself.” 80  VINASHIN also received loans from the fund of 
Ministry of Labor, Invalided and Social Affairs to deal with the debt to workers.  
 
Next, the government will continue to lend preferential loans to VINASHIN. The 
government was worried that “if VINASHIN had to go bankrupt, all the assets would be 
wasted while the government would still have to establish another ship-building company as 
Vietnam was a country having advantages in long coastal line and ship-building industry is a 
must.”81 This viewpoint showed that the government considered VINASHIN itself the ship-
building industry as well as the key to boost the economy.  Besides, in the government’s 
opinion, VINASHIN already had experience in shipbuilding. Therefore, in order to help 
VINASHIN to overcome difficulty due to huge debt, “the government would provide enough 
charter capital using Enterprise Arrangement Fund and other suitable financial resources so 
that VINASHIN could pay abroad debt when they fall dues, restructure its credit debt, 
complete on-progress projects….”82 The government has expected that VINASHIN could 
gain positive production outcomes, make profit and pay back the loans. Therefore, the 
                                                          
80  My My, “Special mechanism for VINASHIN’s restructuring plan,” National Laws 
Newspaper Online, February 19, 2011, http://www.phapluatvn.vn/kinhte/201102/Se-co-co-
che-dac-biet-cho-Vinashin-tai-co-cau-2033968/, the original article is in Vietnamese 
81  Tu Nguyen, “The government will continue to give VINASHIN loans,” Vneconomy 
Newspaper, August 05, 2010, http://vneconomy.vn/20100805121612716P0C5/chinh-phu-se-
tiep-tuc-cho-vinashin-vay.htm, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
82 Ibid. 
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government has insisted that “[i]f necessary, the government would [again] issue government 
bonds to provide VINASHIN with loans so that VINASHIN could gain a balanced 
status…”83  
 
Although the government has given a lot of support, from 2011 to 2012, the new 
leadership VINASHIN has been asking for more loans. “In the beginning of 2012, 
VINASHIN has been approved to continue borrowing more loans at the interest rate of 0% 
from Vietnam Development Bank due to its remained financial difficulty.”84  
 
In order to reduce the burden of debt for VINASHIN, the government moved a 
number of subsidiaries of VINASHIN to other SOEs including VINALINES and PVN who 
are also big SOEs. These SOEs also receive preferences if agreeing to accept the moved parts 
of VINASHIN. “…[T]he companies who were moved to VINALINES would get the loans at 
the preferential interest rate of 0%...in order to pay salaries owed to their workers, social 
insurance, health insurance, unemployment insurance, unemployment subsidies, creating new 
jobs and training. In particular, Vietnam Development Bank will be responsible for giving 
these enterprises loans. Besides, Social Policy Bank will support workers at these enterprises 
…who were unemployed in 2010 and 2011 with loans using National Fund of the National 
                                                          
83 Ibid. 
84  Nhat Nam, “VINASHIN has borrowed 292 billion VND at the interest rate of 0%,” 
Vneconomy Newspaper, February 16, 2012, 
http://vneconomy.vn/20120216065636449P0C5/vinashin-duoc-vay-hon-292-ty-dong-lai-
suat-0.htm/, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
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Target Program on Employment …[as stated] in the Decision no. 157/2007/QĐ-TTg dated 
27/9/2007 by the Prime Minister.”85  
 
All the above financial continuous support implies that the government still continues 
its backing up unsuccessful firms. Moreover, there have been always other SOEs who are 
ready to share the risk and the consequences of one SOE’s inefficiency. In another word, 
there has been no single person who is responsible for the losses of VINASHIN. VINASHIN 
was set up by the government, using the government’s financial resources. It borrowed more 
from other SOEs who are also using the government’s financial resources. This explains why 
when VINASHIN faced to bankruptcy and its leaders had to admit to law court, its creditors 
stated that they did not want to get their loans back86. This is because they are managers of 
the loans, not the owners. This implies that as long as the state-owned assets are managed 
under administration system, there is no one responsible for the assets usage and protection. 
This even leads to the moral hazard in and among different SOEs.  
 
Another point is thinking that close direction will lead to more effective operation, the 
government has assigned the MOT to supervise and evaluate closely all VINASHIN’s 
objectives, master plan, organization and investment and report to the Prime Minister. 
However, line ministries are purely administrative agencies whose direction cannot guarantee 
firms’ good investment in all cases. Furthermore, in the restructuring plan, although there are 
                                                          
85 Nguyen Thang, “Prime Minister’s decision to give loans at the interest rate of 0% to the 
enterprises who were moved from VINASHIN to VINALINES,” Bao Moi Newspaper, 
December 29, 2010, http://www.baomoi.com/Quyet-dinh-cua-Thu-tuong-Chinh-phu-cho-
Vinashin-vay-lai-xuat-0/47/5460704.epi, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
86 Thanh Phong, “Creditors do not want to get their loans back,” Thanh nien Newspaper, 
http://www.thanhnien.com.vn/pages/20120330/du-doanh-nghiep-khong-doi-vien-van-bao-ve-
tai-san-nha-nuoc.aspx, the original article is in Vietnamese. 
 
 64 
 
efforts to make VINASHIN focus on its relevant areas and reduce debt, there is little 
information about the incentives to motivate the new leaders to operate VINASHIN 
efficiently. 
 
The overall restructuring program showed that the government has been intervening 
even deeper into VINASHIN and making it more of an administrative agency than before. 
VINASHIN continues to receive support to practice its policy-practicing role as to maintain 
and develop the ship-building industry. The moral hazard happens when the leadership of 
SOEs could assume that it is safe if they make frequent reports to the line ministry so that the 
ministry can be responsible when the firm is inefficient. Again, this method endangers the 
future of VINASHIN. This is also consistent with the right hand side of the proposition (1) 
and rejects that of the proposition (2). 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
1. Doubled moral hazard due to the combination of government’s support and 
heavy intervention into VINASHIN’s management  
The case of VINASHIN is consistent with the main hypothesis (proposition (1)). The 
case also rejects the alternative one (proposition (2)). 
It is obvious that the government has tried to supervise, support and rescue 
VINASHIN with a desire to make the ship-building industry one of the driving forces of the 
whole economy. Considering the collapse of VINASHIN the failure of the industry, the 
government tried to rescue VINASHIN after insolvency. The burden of the debt created by 
VINASHIN was shared by other SOEs including PVN and VINALINES. More loans, new 
leadership and stricter supervision were the government’s solutions to the situation. However, 
the government’s financial backing and its heavy intervention lead to doubled moral hazard. 
This logic can be applied to other SOEs. Certainly, specific cases needs to be further studied.  
First, the government created favorable conditions for VINASHIN including easy 
access to huge loans domestically and internationally together with little interruption by 
auditing plans. However, as VINASHIN’s leaders had relied on the support and induced 
seriously risk-taking behavior, VINASHIN fell into huge debt.  
At the same time, thinking that closer supervision and direction will help the firm to 
perform better, the government has intervened into VINASHIN’s investment decisions 
frequently.  Moreover, the government has tried to manage VINASHIN as an administrative 
office to realize the government’s policies. However, VINASHIN had little motivation to 
make profit or save losses. In addition, the interest of the individuals managing the firm has 
not been linked to the firm’s outcome. They tended to fulfill the tasks they are ordered. 
Therefore, opposite to the government’s expectation, the firm has operated inefficiently while 
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claiming that it has been simply following government’s direction.  Again, this sequence of 
the government and VINASHIN’s risky behavior is consistent with the hypothesis explained 
in the proposition (1):  
Financial Backing + Top-down Intervention = Careless Decision + Passive Management 
 
This paradox happened again even after the firm’s insolvency. Facing to the 
insolvency of VINASHIN, the government has tried again to bring VINASHIN back. Using 
the same method of providing loans, however, together with new leadership and supervision, 
the government hoped that VINASHIN would restructure successfully. Moreover, the 
government allowed VINASHIN to continue borrowing the revenue from bond issues and 
used various funds to support the employment status.  Even though the government has 
changed the CEO of VINASHIN after its insolvency, there have been few incentives for the 
CEO to utilize his independence. The CEO of VINASHIN continues to realize the 
government’s orders and has to follow orders closer. After insolvency, VINASHIN has been 
still in huge debt and shows little signals of improvement. This rejects proposition (2): 
Capable Leadership + Financial Backing + Top- down Intervention = Careful Decision 
+ Active Management 
 
Moreover, the government’s efforts in helping VINASHIN to restructure would have 
serious impact on other SOEs. This creates a stronger belief that the government will ever 
rescue SOEs which easily leads to more moral hazard in SOEs. 
Besides, as analyzed in the previous chapter, the government considered VINASHIN 
ship-building industry. Providing VINASHIN with financial support has been always valued 
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as maintaining and supporting the ship-building industry which has been proved to be an 
advantageous industry for Vietnam due to the country’s long coastal line. Actually, the ship-
building industry could be developed with other methods, not just providing financial support 
to one SOE, in this case, VINASHIN.  Therefore, separated policies and incentives to 
develop ship-building industry must be established and based on the characteristics of this 
industry. This issue needs further study. In addition, when the method of providing financial 
resources did not guarantee VINASHIN’s utmost efforts in production, it should not be used 
again in such as short period of time. 
2. Implied reduction in the government’s role in VINASHIN as well as other 
SOEs 
Since the restructuring program, VINASHIN has not shown noticeable signs of 
improvement. It is time for the government to reconsider its role in VINASHIN. This can 
also be applied to other SOEs. However, how to apply to each particular SOE should be 
further studied. In details, based on the analyses of this case study, the reduction of the 
government’s role can be achieved by the following ways: 
[Reducing top-down orders] 
VINASHIN could not at the same time realizes the government’s policies and makes 
profit. Top-down orders have decided what VINASHIN had to invest into. Together with 
financial backing, it carelessly invested into the areas assigned. Therefore, VINASHIN 
should only focus in one objective as to operate profitably. When it becomes a strong 
enterprise, it could contribute to realize the government’s policies. 
[Creating more incentives for the leadership of VINASHIN] 
VINASHIN has got a new leadership. However, the leadership of VINASHIN has 
been working as orders-practitioners. They have little chance to prove their capability. They 
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have had to pay attention to work as closely to the task they are assigned as possible. 
Therefore they could not pay enough attention to running VINASHIN as a profitable ship-
builder. There should be more incentives to motivate the people who are responsible for the 
development of the economic group. If the government’s intervention is limited, the 
proposition (2) in the paper can change. Therefore, the right hand side of the proposition (2) 
has the possibility to happen. However, this needs further study. 
[Reducing new loans for VINASHIN] 
The government has been supporting VINASHIN after the restructuring program with 
new loans and lower interest to pay debt. VINASHIN has simply used new debt to pay old 
debt. However, this support is inefficient as VINASHIN has continued to ask for more loans, 
explaining that it needs more time to boost its production. The paper assumes that the new 
leadership is trying to operate VINASHIN with utmost efforts. However, with such huge debt 
and a number of on-progress projects, efforts are not enough. VINASHIN faced insolvency 
and it should go through normal debt-equity swap. The government should let an independent 
third party to work on VINASHIN’s debt. 
What is the most challenging problem is that as analyzed in the previous chapter, a 
number of creditors are actually other SOEs, the leaders of which do not have incentives to 
require VINASHIN to pay debt. This is serious to the whole country as there is no particular 
party who is responsible for this kind of debt. Instead of waiting these SOE-creditors to 
become more responsible, the government should also let an independent third party to work 
on the case.87 
 
 
                                                          
87 This issue is quite challenging and should be further studied, especially when it may 
happen not only in VINASHIN but a number of other SOEs. 
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[Avoid rescuing all inefficient subsidiaries] 
The government has moved a number of VINASHIN’s subsidiaries to other SOEs. 
However, when a number of subsidiaries are also in debt and operate inefficiently, there are 
few evidences that they will become efficient when being moved to other SOEs. Debt and 
insolvency of these subsidiaries should also go through normal debt-equity swap process. 
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